TKP 10/3/2010
The public security crisis is but a symptom of the ineffectuality and paralysis with which the government is afflicted
The home minister’s job, under prevailing circumstances, seems doomed to failure. The first two individuals who held the position after the 2006 Jana Andolan -- Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Bam Dev Gautam -- were both vilified, either for the ineffectuality of the police administration or for use of indiscriminate, brute force. And following the two recent high-profile assassinations, the current Home Minister Bhim Rawal too has been hounded with demands for his resignation. He is held responsible for the excessive politicization of the police force, of taking decisions on recruitment, transfers and promotions solely on the basis of loyalty to his party, the CPN-UML, regional preference (he comes from the relatively backward Far West), shoving aside competent and experienced personnel, centralizing all power in his hands, and thus causing a breakdown in the chain of command and general morale of the state security forces.
It is natural, of course, that the nation’s top functionary for the maintenance of public security be blamed for lapses. And Rawal may indeed be guilty of all that he has been charged of. But to locate the source of the current security crisis solely in the actions (or inaction) of a single individual, without taking into account the broader political context and the responsibilities of the other ministries, would be to let off the government and the entire political class too lightly.
The root cause of the failure to curtail the violence, extortion and murder committed by both purportedly political and blatantly criminal groups operating in the Tarai is the ineffectuality and lack of direction of the current governing coalition. Formed through accidental circumstances, consumed by fear that the Maoists have become too powerful and the various political interests that have emerged over the past few years unmanageable, it is afflicted by paralysis. Its commitment to a more inclusive state with a radical devolution of power is limited to rhetoric; in fact it desires nothing more than a return to what in memory are the halcyon days of the 1990s when the power of its major constituent parties was undisputed. Since its interventions to reverse history have been futile, it stands -- helplessly, shakily -- on political ground that is swiftly shifting its their feet.
There is refusal to understand that the solutions to the security crisis -- as with all other political crises facing Nepal today -- are long term and require fundamental changes to the entire apparatus of the state. The much-touted Special Security Plan has as its basis the belief that problems of security can be solved through the crudest application of brute and indiscriminate force. The understanding is so unsubtle that there have been no attempts to distinguish between groups with an actual political agenda and those that are solely criminal. And the government’s refusal to see the distinction of the two has actually brought the political and criminal groups closer. As a recent report on torture and extra-judicial killings in the Tarai by Advocacy Forum reveals, faced with a crisis of existence and ignored by the state, armed groups with a political agenda have been patronizing groups that are purely criminal. The latter are allowed to operate freely as long as they give a cut of their extortion profits to the former.
The previous two governments at least had an idea that improving the security situation would have to involve political engagement with groups claiming to represent the Madhesi population. By attempting to draw these groups into the political mainstream, it was recognized, criminal gangs could be isolated and so the action taken against them would enjoy broad societal and political support. The current government appears to think that such political negotiation is no longer necessary, as all Madhesi groups have diminished in political importance. But what is unrecognized is that armed groups still have connections with locally and nationally influential political leaders, that it is through these connections that they ensure they remain unpunished, and it is these connections that give them power to further patronize groups that are wholly criminal. Political engagement thus still remains essential: the major parties in power need the Madhesi parties with links to the armed groups on their side in order to isolate and punish those engaged in extortion and murder.
But of course, the parties in power have more important things to think about. Previous ministers of peace -- Ram Chandra Poudel and Janardhan Sharma ‘Prabhakar’ -- may have had time to reach out to these groups and attempt to defang them, but the energies of the person currently holding the position, Rakam Chemjong, is wholly consumed in his mission to weaken the Maoists and their PLA. So he is furiously engaged in a pointless public war with UNMIN, accusing it of being biased in favour of the Maoists and demanding that it reveal all details regarding combatants in cantonments.
This is but one example of how narrow the government’s outlook it, how its constituent parties are concerned with nothing but fighting the steady decline in their support bases. And here too the strategies they have adopted are characterized by extreme myopia. In the Tarai, for example, they could have gained greater credibility by moving towards taking the Madhesi parties into confidence to draft legislation that ensures greater inclusion in state bodies. This would help raise morale in the Tarai and, in the longer term, lead to an improvement in the security situation there. This was what, as will be remembered, the Maoists sought to do through their attempts to pass an Inclusion Ordinance. But that lapsed without ratification by parliament and no word has been heard about it since. Instead, as the Advocacy Forum report states, the Nepali Congress and the UML have sought greater influence in the Tarai by competing with Madhesi parties in intervening “with police to get members of armed groups accused of serious crimes, including rape, released from police custody apparently in return for their future loyalty.”
Expectations of what the current government could accomplish were low even when it assumed power in May 2009. It is now time to say that it has failed; that it is so deeply sunk into a mire, largely of its own making, that extrication from it is impossible.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
The creation of space
TKP 2/3/2010
There is an ideological vacuum waiting to be filled on the right of Nepali politics
If there is any party to be admired for consistency and sheer doggedness against all political trends, it has to be Kamal Thapa’s Rastriya Prajatantra Party — Nepal (RPP-N). When it has become conventional to blame all of Nepal’s ills on its feudal past and rulers who sought only to plunder the state, it believes that the monarchy should be restored. When even the orthodox have been forced to accept that the state’s reliance on Hindu symbols caused the marginalisation of other cultures and religions, it demands that state be once again be declared Hindu. And when even those greatly troubled with the proposed federalisation of the nation acknowledge that there is no alternative to radical devolution of powers and the granting of provincial and local autonomy, the RPP-N remains committed to a unitary, centralised state. And so the party staged a banda last week demanding a nation-wide referendum on all three of these issues.
In order for these demands to gain ground, it is necessary for the polarisation within the mainstream — between the Maoists and the non-Maoists, between ethnic/regional groups and the parties at the centre — has to become so extreme that there is no possibility that the peace process as conceived can continue. The traditional parliamentary parties have to feel that the only way to outplay the Maoists is by forming a front of all non-Maoist groupings and adopting rhetoric in sharp opposition to that of the Maoists, thus forcing the entire nation to choose between two sharply polarised sides. It is only in such a situation that a referendum on the issues that Kamal Thapa has been raising can take place.
In other words, it is impossible that the broader political class will accept the RPP-N’s demands in the near future. Members of the Nepali Congress or the CPN-UML will neither allow committing publicly to the values of the extreme right, nor will it serve to expand their popular bases. Even Kamal Thapa’s old allies, even though they may desire the same things as the RPP-N, feel that it would be foolhardy to follow the path that he has taken. Panchayat stalwarts like Surya Bahadur Thapa appear to have thought it best to let causes such as the restoration of the monarchy lie and publicly accept the legitimacy of all the changes that have occurred over the past few years. Rather, the effort, in his view, should be to form a “democratic alliance” of all non-Maoist forces that will co-opt aspects of the socio-economic agenda that the Maoists have raised, thus creating an alternative to them that has real political potency.
And yet there is a case to be made regarding the wisdom of Kamal Thapa’s path. For, there is an ideological vacuum on the right of Nepali politics that is waiting to be filled. As of now the first stirrings of a reaction to the current discourse of inclusion and autonomy have started to become visible — in the formation of Bahun and Chhetri political organisations for instance, or in their demands to be considered “indigenous nationalities” by the state. This process has a long way to go. It requires, for one, better ideological articulation. In its current form, it has simply adopted the manner of organisation and rhetoric of assertion of all the other marginalised groups. As such, it appears fraudulent — notwithstanding the poverty of Bahuns and Chhetris in the Far West, it is difficult to convince that these groups have been victims of historical injustice. Also, lacking any idea greater than allegiance to a particular caste or ethnicity, it also appears tribal. This is one of the reasons why many upper caste political leaders in the traditional parliamentary parties, while willing to admit some sympathy for these movements in private, are unable to come out publicly as their supporters or leaders.
As the process of consolidation of political groups opposed to the current trend in Nepali politics continues, there will come a stage when they will have to form alliances with each other and devise symbols and ideas that give their movements ideological coherence. It is here that the current efforts of Kamal Thapa, if strategic enough, can pay dividends. He may have to give up the demand for a monarchy. But the demand for a centralised state and for state recognition of the symbols and values of Hinduism, in alliance with more grassroots conservative movements currently underway, can still be potent.
If efforts to revive Hinduism as a political tool and utilize it for purposes of mass mobilisation are to succeed, however, its radical reinvention is necessary. So far there have been very few people willing to use the religion as a political instrument; this is partially because of its association with the monarchy. It is also because while the monarchy used Hindu symbols to gain legitimacy, it never used the religion as an ideology with which to mobilise large numbers of people. The character of Nepali Hinduism has remained decentralised, practiced by the faithful in whatever manner they see fit. To become an ideology of the right, Nepali Hinduism needs to be reinvented along the lines of Indian Hindutva, where a central socio-political authority has built a mass organisation that seeks the active participation of people in activities ranging from religious training to physical exercises.
Again similarly to Hindutva, the utilisation of the religion of a political tool will require the redefinition of the religion to make it inclusive. One of the reasons Hinduism has not reemerged as a political tool after the 2006 Jana Andolan is because everyone recognises that so far, the religion has been used as an instrument of exclusion. Of course, it would be foolish to think that all of the country’s diverse groups would seek entry into the religion once its self-proclaimed leaders claim that their participation is welcome. But this is not to say that the foot soldiers for a Hindu political movement would be limited to relatively poor Bahuns and Chhetris without great access to state power. While they are obviously the ones most likely to be attracted to such a movement, it is quite likely that highly marginalised groups that will not benefit much from federalism will also be willing to join the fold. The Dalits are an obvious example. Dispersed across the country and thus as fearful of federalism (and of the dominant groups in the provinces) as the upper castes, it is likely that some of them would be attracted to a political-cultural movement that offers them a sense of belonging. This strategy has, of course, already been utilised in India by Hindu nationalists to attract tribals and other dispossessed groups.
It is not yet clear whether Kamal Thapa wishes to take his party in this direction, or is capable of doing so. If he plays his cards right, however, and is willing to stay in the game for the long haul, there is a chance that his efforts will someday bear fruit.
There is an ideological vacuum waiting to be filled on the right of Nepali politics
If there is any party to be admired for consistency and sheer doggedness against all political trends, it has to be Kamal Thapa’s Rastriya Prajatantra Party — Nepal (RPP-N). When it has become conventional to blame all of Nepal’s ills on its feudal past and rulers who sought only to plunder the state, it believes that the monarchy should be restored. When even the orthodox have been forced to accept that the state’s reliance on Hindu symbols caused the marginalisation of other cultures and religions, it demands that state be once again be declared Hindu. And when even those greatly troubled with the proposed federalisation of the nation acknowledge that there is no alternative to radical devolution of powers and the granting of provincial and local autonomy, the RPP-N remains committed to a unitary, centralised state. And so the party staged a banda last week demanding a nation-wide referendum on all three of these issues.
In order for these demands to gain ground, it is necessary for the polarisation within the mainstream — between the Maoists and the non-Maoists, between ethnic/regional groups and the parties at the centre — has to become so extreme that there is no possibility that the peace process as conceived can continue. The traditional parliamentary parties have to feel that the only way to outplay the Maoists is by forming a front of all non-Maoist groupings and adopting rhetoric in sharp opposition to that of the Maoists, thus forcing the entire nation to choose between two sharply polarised sides. It is only in such a situation that a referendum on the issues that Kamal Thapa has been raising can take place.
In other words, it is impossible that the broader political class will accept the RPP-N’s demands in the near future. Members of the Nepali Congress or the CPN-UML will neither allow committing publicly to the values of the extreme right, nor will it serve to expand their popular bases. Even Kamal Thapa’s old allies, even though they may desire the same things as the RPP-N, feel that it would be foolhardy to follow the path that he has taken. Panchayat stalwarts like Surya Bahadur Thapa appear to have thought it best to let causes such as the restoration of the monarchy lie and publicly accept the legitimacy of all the changes that have occurred over the past few years. Rather, the effort, in his view, should be to form a “democratic alliance” of all non-Maoist forces that will co-opt aspects of the socio-economic agenda that the Maoists have raised, thus creating an alternative to them that has real political potency.
And yet there is a case to be made regarding the wisdom of Kamal Thapa’s path. For, there is an ideological vacuum on the right of Nepali politics that is waiting to be filled. As of now the first stirrings of a reaction to the current discourse of inclusion and autonomy have started to become visible — in the formation of Bahun and Chhetri political organisations for instance, or in their demands to be considered “indigenous nationalities” by the state. This process has a long way to go. It requires, for one, better ideological articulation. In its current form, it has simply adopted the manner of organisation and rhetoric of assertion of all the other marginalised groups. As such, it appears fraudulent — notwithstanding the poverty of Bahuns and Chhetris in the Far West, it is difficult to convince that these groups have been victims of historical injustice. Also, lacking any idea greater than allegiance to a particular caste or ethnicity, it also appears tribal. This is one of the reasons why many upper caste political leaders in the traditional parliamentary parties, while willing to admit some sympathy for these movements in private, are unable to come out publicly as their supporters or leaders.
As the process of consolidation of political groups opposed to the current trend in Nepali politics continues, there will come a stage when they will have to form alliances with each other and devise symbols and ideas that give their movements ideological coherence. It is here that the current efforts of Kamal Thapa, if strategic enough, can pay dividends. He may have to give up the demand for a monarchy. But the demand for a centralised state and for state recognition of the symbols and values of Hinduism, in alliance with more grassroots conservative movements currently underway, can still be potent.
If efforts to revive Hinduism as a political tool and utilize it for purposes of mass mobilisation are to succeed, however, its radical reinvention is necessary. So far there have been very few people willing to use the religion as a political instrument; this is partially because of its association with the monarchy. It is also because while the monarchy used Hindu symbols to gain legitimacy, it never used the religion as an ideology with which to mobilise large numbers of people. The character of Nepali Hinduism has remained decentralised, practiced by the faithful in whatever manner they see fit. To become an ideology of the right, Nepali Hinduism needs to be reinvented along the lines of Indian Hindutva, where a central socio-political authority has built a mass organisation that seeks the active participation of people in activities ranging from religious training to physical exercises.
Again similarly to Hindutva, the utilisation of the religion of a political tool will require the redefinition of the religion to make it inclusive. One of the reasons Hinduism has not reemerged as a political tool after the 2006 Jana Andolan is because everyone recognises that so far, the religion has been used as an instrument of exclusion. Of course, it would be foolish to think that all of the country’s diverse groups would seek entry into the religion once its self-proclaimed leaders claim that their participation is welcome. But this is not to say that the foot soldiers for a Hindu political movement would be limited to relatively poor Bahuns and Chhetris without great access to state power. While they are obviously the ones most likely to be attracted to such a movement, it is quite likely that highly marginalised groups that will not benefit much from federalism will also be willing to join the fold. The Dalits are an obvious example. Dispersed across the country and thus as fearful of federalism (and of the dominant groups in the provinces) as the upper castes, it is likely that some of them would be attracted to a political-cultural movement that offers them a sense of belonging. This strategy has, of course, already been utilised in India by Hindu nationalists to attract tribals and other dispossessed groups.
It is not yet clear whether Kamal Thapa wishes to take his party in this direction, or is capable of doing so. If he plays his cards right, however, and is willing to stay in the game for the long haul, there is a chance that his efforts will someday bear fruit.
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