The UML way

TKP 15/9/2009

Why is the CPN-UML threatening to implode at the very moment when it should remain most united?

Despite the Maoists’ efforts to undermine the Madhav Kumar Nepal government, the coalition of the 22-parties remain relatively strong, and so continues to remain in power, though somewhat uncomfortably. But fractures have appeared: between the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, within the Nepali Congress, and, most seriously, within the UML itself.

The UML may have by now, two decades after playing the game of parliamentary democracy, be in most aspects communist in name only. But it continues to follow, at least in principle, the Leninist model of party organization -- what is known in communist literature as democratic centralism. The party organization is democratic because it allows elections to all of its bodies and encourages intense debate regarding the policies and directions of the party. It is centralized because once a decision is taken, everybody -- including its most vehement critics -- are expected to strictly adhere to the party line. As Lenin said, “freedom of discussion, unity in action.”

The principle of democratic centralism is perhaps the one single aspect of communist doctrine that the UML continues to share with the Maoists. This principle has served the Maoists well: enabling the creation of a hierarchical, highly disciplined party that can act in unity, while at the same time able to contain dissent by allowing for a free expression of views.

Not so, however, for the UML. Barely XX months after its national convention, which was to resolve all disputes within the party, unite and strengthen it, the disputes among its top leaders has intensified to an unprecedented level. There is a struggle ongoing between Jhalanath Khanal and K.P. Oli over who is to establish control over the entire party body and dictate its direction. While Prime Minister Nepal is inclined towards Oli (after all Khanal is against the very existence of the current government), the struggle between the two has made him highly uncomfortable -- for a split in the UML would not only weaken the party, but would likely lead to a collapse of the government.

Why has the Leninist model of party organization served the Maoists so well and the UML so poorly? The fact is that the UML, while paying lip service to the principle of democratic centralism (Khanal, in particular, has recently been invoking this principle at UML gatherings to legitimize his control), no longer possesses the characteristics that are necessary if the principle is to apply.

If Leninist principles are to contribute to a strengthening of the party, first, the party should share a vision of its direction. While it is possible to hold diverging views on precise ideological details, it is necessary for a communist party to share a joint vision of struggle against other social groups if it is to remain united and maintain discipline. The UML not only does not possess a vision of struggle, it has not been able to articulate any shared conception of the future -- other than the platitudes of drafting the constitution and completing the peace process on schedule. The government thus appears adrift, increasing discontent among the Khanal faction, who from the very beginning had viewed the Nepal-led government as deeply compromised due to its proximity with right-wing forces.

Second, without a shared vision, personality has become more important within the UML than policy or ideology. The ideological struggle within the UML -- about whether to work in unity with the Maoists or to continue the partnership with the Nepali Congress -- is important, but it is secondary. The primary consideration for the party’s leaders is how to consolidate personal power, both within the party and among the various power centres that be. Policy direction is important insofar as it contributes the individual leader’s ability to consolidate his power. For instance, Oli chose his virulently anti-Maoist stance because he sees a political future for himself in alliance with the forces that wish to see the Maoists weakened and crushed.

Third, if the principle of democratic centralism is to contribute to the strengthening of a communist party, it is necessary for the party to remain detached from other political forces and hold them in a certain degree of contempt. Only then is it possible to maintain fierce discipline and loyalty to the party. Leaders of the UML, after two decades of political exercise in Kathmandu, have become intimate with a wide variety of social and political forces outside the party. The sources of power and resources for individual leaders come not only from within the party, but increasingly from the outside. Various UML leaders have succumbed in the past decade to the temptation of using sympathetic power centres to consolidate one’s power and undermine rivals within the party. More recently, before General Katawal’s retirement, Oli was cultivating the Army, and it appears that the Maoists are attempting to cultivate Khanal. In the process, the party has been opened up to manipulation from outside forces and has been weakened. As the epigraph to the classic work on communist party organization, Lenin’s What is to be Done?, states, “the greatest proof of the weakness of a party is diffuseness and the blurring of clearly defined boundaries.”

Fourth, a charismatic -- or at the least, undisputed -- leader is required if the principles of democratic centralism are to apply. The disputes that arise within communist parties are often vehement and, as in other parties, each leader has personal ambitions. Only a leader of high charisma, with great ability to manipulate leaders against each other and thus maintain an equilibrium of power, can ensure that a single policy line is adhered to. The Maoists have Prachanda who can do this; the UML hasn’t had such a leader since the death of Madan Bhandari.

As will be clear, the basic principles of communist party organization are exceedingly difficult to uphold for a party that is deeply enmeshed into a political system where it has to compete electorally and otherwise with other parties for power. For, such a party has to appeal to diverse constituencies. It cannot afford to wage a “struggle” against important political and social forces. Then, participation in such a system necessarily weakens the ideological component of the party, as it is forced to become more pragmatic and rely on networks of patronage for power. And it being impossible to avoid contact and intimacy with non-party members in such a system, the fierce loyalty of cadres towards the party diminishes.

The Maoists are currently watching the conflicts within the UML, smug in the knowledge that its organization is superior to theirs. But it would do well to learn that its system of party organization works only in situations where the party is in revolution or when it has monopoly over all power. And if the party organization is neither able to adapt to the exigencies of multi-party politics, nor to make the political system adapt to the style of party organization (that is to centralize all power in its hands), the Maoists may in the long term go the way of the UML.