Tactics and strategy

TKP 13/12/2009

The Maoists are playing a long-term game with the objective of installing themselves in power so firmly that they cannot be dislodged

The Maoists are driven by contradictory desires and constraints, and although their eventual objective is to return to head the government there is little coherence in the various views within the party on how to get there. Pushpa Kamal Dahal was in negotiations with G.P. Koirala. They discussed whether they could reach an agreement whereby their two parties could replace this government with one led by Koirala or, as Koirala tried to convince Dahal, whether the major leaders of all the major parties should participate in a High Level Mechanism that would eventually replace the government. The Nepali Congress felt that Koirala was acting unilaterally and against the wishes of the party and made their displeasure clear through the media.

But what did not emerge so clearly was the opposition to any such move within the Maoist party. If the top party leadership is engaged in negotiations with other party leaders to see if an alternative to the current government can be found, the mood within the Maoist base is to begin the much talked about Jana Andolan after Tihar. There have been preparations and the cadre is in mood for a stir. Dahal, it appears, cannot sell the idea of joining a Congress led government or any High Level Mechanism to his colleagues who are deeply involved in the party organization. For that would be perceived by the party’s base as a betrayal: after being taught by party leaders that they need to struggle against this “puppet” government and its “reactionary” and “broker” constituents, the party chief cannot go and meekly compromise with the leader of one of these parties.

In fact, the Maoists have been following a path that makes it internally difficult to sell a compromise with other political parties ever since the party’s Kharipati convention of November 2008. There, it was decided that, with the monarchy no longer present to protect “nationalism”, the chief agenda should be to struggle against “expansionist” India and its agents the Nepali Congress and other parliamentary parties. The entire incident where the other parties came together to block the Maoists’ decision to sack the Army chief and which led to the collapse of the Maoist-led government has only made the Maoists ratchet up rhetoric concerning the danger to nationalism from all these forces. The recent Central Committee meeting again decided that the struggle against feudals, broker and expansionist elements should be of primary priority.

These are the constraints that Prachanda faces within the party that prevent him from forming alliances with those outside to come back into power. Although he is likely tempted to (after all, the drive to power is a major part of his personality, and he thrives on negotiation, manipulation and temporary compromise), it is more important for him to maintain his position within his party, which, since at least early this year has started to weaken. As a result he has to appear more committed to the party line, more nationalist than the most nationalist elements in the party.

So although it is often repeated, and is known to much of leadership across parties, that the two decisive political forces at the moment are the Maoists and India, the Maoists have made no effort to cultivate the latter. It was imagined that soon after the collapse of the Maoist-led government, the party would come along to the recognition that they would have to renegotiate terms with the Indian establishment if they wished to reenter government. They would then abandon rhetoric regarding Indian interference, and seek to try and understand what red lines they would have to stay within to gain the minimal trust of India. But there has been no meaningful engagement between the Maoists and India. Instead, Dahal, in the full knowledge that the principal reason for India’s erosion in trust in the Maoists was because it felt that they were attempting to shift the geo-political balance of power in South Asia by allowing Chinese penetration into Nepal, decided to pay visits to meet Chinese officials in Hong Kong and then to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao himself in Beijing.

To continue to cultivate China at the expense of India is a dangerous strategy for the Maoists. They risk completely antagonizing India while not receiving the desired support from the Chinese, whose interests in Nepal are much more restricted. What they appear to be gambling on is the fact that their party organization and hold over society is superior to those of the other political parties. Despite differences within their party, they party leadership has managed to maintain cohesion, in start contrast to the Congress and the UML, where all energies are focused on internal disputes, leading to a lack of direction in the broader political sphere and a sapping of morale.

The Maoists’ calculation appears to be that the other parties can be further weakened if the Maoists negotiate with leaders like G.P. Koirala and Jhalanath Khanal. By prying away these leaders from the bulk of their party leadership, internal strife will commence that will consume these parties. In the meantime, the Maoist party will remain united, and when the time comes, choose one potential policy direction among the many that appear to exist now and pursue it wholeheartedly. Once established as the dominant political force in the country, the calculation goes, India and other members of the international community will be forced to come to terms with them. The Maoist desire is not to immediately make the current government collapse and replace it with one that they lead. If done with too much haste and too much compromise with other political forces, their government could well be as fragile as the previous one that the Maoists led. Their current maneuverings are part of a much longer-term game, with the objective of installing themselves in power so firmly that they cannot be dislodged for a long period of time.