New premises

TKP 29/12/2009

Amidst all the outrage, it went unnoticed that Prachanda’s speech was meant to send a number of key messages to Delhi

It is clear that Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s controversial speech addressing India marked the beginning of a new strategy for the Maoist party. This was largely lost amidst all the outraged noise generated in response to the speech -- outrage enough for Dahal to get nervous and state that his words were meant to be “satirical”. No notice was played to the fact that the speech was not merely a fiery tirade: Prachanda repeatedly stated that his mood was not of rage and that he recognized the necessity of maintaining good relations with India. Rather, his message was that the Delhi establishment had to drop some of the premises it held regarding India-Nepal relations. Only by doing so, was the claim, could there develop a healthy relationship between the Indian establishment and the Maoists.

Among the messages that Prachanda wished to convey was that the Indian establishment had to recognize that the Maoist party was unlike the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML and did not even bear a slight resemblance to parties such as Surya Bahadur Thapa’s Rastriya Janashakti Party (RJP). And if India thought that it could turn the Maoists into a political force resembling the others, it was grossly mistaken. This was a reference to the fact that leaders in the traditional parliamentary parties had over the course of the past two decades demonstrated that they were greatly susceptible to overtures from the Indian establishment. It has become a tradition in Nepal for political leaders of all hues to seek India’s support to help them undermine their rivals in other political parties as well as within their own. As a result, the Indian establishment achieved deep penetration into the Nepali Congress and UML, which it often used towards it own advantage: often by playing one faction in a party against another, sometimes by actually splitting parties by playing on the hopes and desires of various leaders.

Among the various efforts that the Indian establishment is currently engaged in, it appears it is seeking to cultivate individual Maoist leaders through lures of various kinds while ensuring that the broader party continues to be isolated from other forces and kept out of government. This, it is hoped will lead, if not to an outright split, to disarray and a weakening of the Maoist party. Delhi was deluding itself, Prachanda said, if it thought it could fragment the Maoist party and insert itself into its internal politics. If India deals with the Maoists as they are, he continued, the party will be seen to be “honest and responsible” in its dealings. If it tries to bring the Maoists to their knees, however, the party would put up whatever resistance it can muster.

Then, Prachanda called for an “open hearted” review of the historical relations that had prevailed between Nepal and India and the creation of foreign policy based on new principles. This, he claimed, has to be undertaken by taking into full confidence the growing public awareness of the populations of both countries.

So far, the machinations that the Indian establishment engages in Nepal have been undertaken secretively and furtively by a handful of officials from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the intelligence agencies. It is difficult to recall the last time India’s Nepal policy was debated in its parliament. Nepal occupies such a marginal place in Indian public discussion that the vast majority of even the educated public is hardly aware of the nature of their country’s involvement in Nepal.

Nepal’s rulers have been content to deal with India in a similarly secretively and in a manner that would benefit their individual political fortunes. Between 1850 and 1950, the rulers basically acceded to a status as semi-colony in return for the Raj’s support in propping up the Rana regime. And although Nepali nationalism was invoked during the Panchayat years to rally the public against “Indian intervention”, this was done chiefly to shore up the legitimacy of the undemocratic political system. Even during this period then, there was much dissimulation regarding the precise nature of India’s efforts in Nepal. As Devendra Raj Panday has pointed out, these efforts could not last as the Panchayat was inherently authoritarian and divorced from the people: when its rulers attempted to drum up nationalistic sentiment to shore up the regime in the face of the trade and transit blockade that India imposed in 1989-90, the Nepali public saw through the charade and surged out onto the streets, thus causing the collapse of the regime.

And, although there were efforts made to publicly drum up nationalist sentiment against political rivals in the decade of the 1990s, privately there were constant efforts to invite India into Nepal’s political arena on the behalf of one side or another. Delhi, of course, was only too happy to oblige, recognizing as it did the opportunity to extend its own influence.

Prachanda asserted that it was untenable for India to maintain thus style of engagement. The Maoists had come to power on the back of mass mobilization unprecedented in Nepal’s history and the political awareness of its people had never been greater. Delhi, he further claimed, had to deal with the Maoist party in the context of the historical transformation that had occurred in Nepali society over the past two decades. As such, the dealings of each country towards the other had to be undertaken in a much more open way than before, and public opinion of both countries had to be taken into account in the creation of foreign policy.

By delivering these messages, as well as calling for a review of the Indo-Nepal treaty and a resolution of the border problems at Susta and Kalapani, Prachanda was asserting that the Maoists, though currently not in power, are the sole legitimate political force in Nepal, and that India has no option but to deal with them directly. The related claim was that the parties currently in power lack the popular support to claim legitimacy; their power, according to Prachanda, derives almost entirely from the support they receive from “above” -- that is from India. It was natural that such an accusation would rankle with the political leaders from the other parties. In fact, it was this -- rather than any concern for “national sovereignty” -- that was responsible for the outraged response from the parties in government and the media.

There continues to be a chasm of trust between the Maoists and the Indians, and it would be foolhardy to believe that India will take to heart what Prachanda had to say. “What you say is well and fine,” is likely to be the response, “but we still don’t trust that your party is committed to democracy. You have to take a number of concrete actions to assure us of your intentions.” In the Maoist view, however, Prachanda’s speech will be considered a success if it leads to wider discussion regarding Nepal among power centres in Delhi and thus enables conditions there that are conducive to a resolution of the crisis in Nepal.