A fine balance

5/1/2010

The Maoists have the capacity to introduce positive changes in the operation of the Nepali state -- but that also depends on factors outside of their control

Aditya Adhikari

What has the Maoist party introduced into Nepal’s political system that marks a departure from the traditional practices of multi-party democracy as practiced in Nepal in the 1950s and 1990s? First, its organization has managed to penetrate areas of society and raise awareness among groups that have hitherto been ignorant of the relationship politics has with their lives. Then, it continues to harbour a mentality fostered during the conflict where for most of its leaders and cadres the interests of the party always supersede all others. This continues to be the case almost five years after the formation of the alliance with the other parliamentary parties against the monarchy. For politicians from the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, their exposure to other social interests after 1990 and their tendency to view their own party colleagues as rivals, gradually led to a diminishment of their loyalty to the party and a proximity to other sources of power. Unlike them, however, five years into the peace process, the centre of gravity for most of the Maoist leaders remains firmly within their own party: the style of functioning of the party is such that if a leader begins to move away from the party’s core ideology and begins to voice opinions resembling those of others on the political spectrum, he or she will face severe chastisement by the party leadership.

From one point of view -- and this is the dominant view among the older parliamentary parties and their supporters today -- this characteristic of the Maoist party means that they have not been effectively socialized into plural politics and are still intent on imposing a one-party state. For, goes the claim, a party that willingly participates in multi-party competition has to be receptive to the needs and interests of diverse groups; its policy should be guided by a pragmatic balancing of interests, not by rigid ideology.

This is, of course, true. But what is not often stated is that the NC and the UML have not been able to balance various interests groups with a view towards creating policies that are in the common good. What has more often happened is that some interest groups have come to possess an inordinate influence over the party. As these groups are the richest and most powerful in Nepali society, the resources of the state have, even after 1990, been excessively channeled towards elite interests -- even though the formal policies passed by successive governments have all claimed that equality and social justice are their core objectives. Further, various powerful groups have gained access to various sections of single political parties. The older parliamentary parties have largely been unable to manage conflicting interests within their own parties, and this has led, to a weakening of the part and the adoption of an incoherent and fragmented policy line.

In order for the Maoist party to introduce something truly worthwhile into Nepal’s politics in their transition from a radical left group waging armed struggle to a political party committed to social justice competing in a multi-party polity, it would have to demonstrate greater openness to diverse interests, while at the same time ensuring that their political centre of gravity remains firmly within the party. In other words, during a future time when they lead government, if the Maoists’ demonstrate more pragmatism and less ideological rigidity, while remaining autonomous from external interests so that the party does not become fragmented, it will be able to follow a coherent policy line based on the interests of the marginalized while still participating in a multi-party framework. As their organizational base and networks across the nation are far superior to what any political force in Nepal has been able to achieve, they would in such a scenario also likely be able to increase the depth and degree of democratic participation.

This outcome, however, is by no means inevitable. In particular, the Maoists, like other traditional communist parties, possess an arrogant view that they are the sole representatives of the oppressed and it is thus difficult to convince them of the value of a pluralistic political system. Those leaders within the party -- and there are a number of them -- who have tried to convince the party rank and file of the desirability of democratic values understand that to openly support multi-party competition is to open oneself to the charges of “revisionism.” Great care has therefore been taken in such efforts and it has been done largely using the traditional language and vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

The need to work together with other political forces has been justified with reference to the Marxist theory of historical development. Nepal is still in the transition from the feudal era to a bourgeois democratic one, it is claimed. Objective historical conditions do not allow for a direct leap into a socialist era. The task therefore is to complete the capitalist revolution, and at this stage of historical development the support of the bourgeoisie -- represented, in Maoist theory, primarily by the Nepali Congress -- is necessary. The party leadership cannot go any further in their support of multi-party democracy: there is no vocabulary in their theory with which to argue that democratic principles such as free speech and the separation of powers are valuable in themselves. After all, all such values have been for a long time been dismissed by Marxists as illusions spread by bourgeois politicians to hide the fact that the state system exists solely so that their class can dominate all others.

Whether the Maoists will in fact transform into a party that is willing to participate in a plural political system therefore depends more on their experience of competitive politics than on their ideology. It will be possible only if the process envisaged in the peace process -- the drafting of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly (regarded in Maoist discourse as the peak of the bourgeois-democratic revolution) and the radical restructuring of state that privileges the dispossessed -- succeeds. Then, the claims of those within the party who argue in favour of an alliance with the “bourgeoisie” will be found to be legitimate. If the other parties only raise the fear of Maoist “state capture”, and believe -- as they do now -- that it is necessary to isolate the Maoists, keep them out of government and obstruct all aspects of their socio-economic agenda, this approach will only serve to alienate the Maoists, make them believe that the “bourgeoisie” has allied with the “feudal and reactionary” elements to obstruct change, and that the only recourse is for the “proletariat” (under the Maoist party) to, having gained state power, to keep it under their total control.

The current position adopted by the older parliamentary parties and India vis-à-vis the Maoist is therefore counterproductive. There is a hope that by continually frustrating and thwarting Maoist demands, the party will develop internal fissures that will, by turning them into the NC and UML, significantly weaken the party and make them penetrable to powerful interests. Even if this approach succeeds -- which so far at least appears unlikely -- it will be highly damaging to Nepal: there will be no party that will even potentially be able to manage diverse groups but still pursue policies towards the socio-economic change that the country so direly needs. In effect, this will mean a return to the fragmented and elite-centred politics of the 1990s.

If, on the other hand, the current approach of the political parties and India is continued even as the Maoists remain united in organization and ideology, the party will adopt a highly intolerant position towards any pluralistic polity and will claim that the revolution can only be completed if the NC and UML are totally destroyed. An armed confrontation between the state and the Maoists will of course be highly damaging to both sides. But in the case that the Maoists do come to power, they will have no incentive to participate in any kind of plural politics. Their approach then will be wholly guided those of the totalitarian Russian and Chinese communist systems of the twentieth century.