Weak state, dependent society

TKP 24/7/2009

Saubhagya Shah's Civil Society in Uncivil Places: Soft State and Regime Change in Nepal

The tremendous space that “civil society” has enjoyed in the public imagination over the past half-decade-both as a notion and as a sphere of social and political activity-has been unprecedented in Nepal's history. That groups that seek to organise to exert pressure on policy now largely do so through the formation of NGOs that claim to be a part of civil society is indicative of the legitimacy the concept now enjoys in Nepal. But the organisations that fall under the category are diverse, and as a result, the reaction they arouse from the public complicated. To say the least, there is great ambivalence towards civil society. On the one hand, for those disillusioned with politics and political parties, civil society enjoys a high degree of prestige. In contrast to politicians, civil society leaders often seem to possess a concern for the common good and a lack of personal ambition. On the other hand, the high degree to which civil society organisations depend on foreign sources for material support undermines their position in the public eye. They are often perceived to be handmaidens of external interests, interested solely in extracting funds from donors and willing to adopt any position in order to do so.

Much of the discussion regarding civil society in Nepal is confused, consisting of a jumbled sum of observations, resentments and anecdotes. It is in its attempt to step beyond this muddle and provide a conceptual framework to understand the nature of civil society in Nepal and its relationship to global trends that Saubhagya Shah's Civil Society in Uncivil Places: Soft State and Regime Change in Nepal is valuable. The detached observation, historical and cross-cultural comparison, and the skepticism he brings to his analysis of civil society raise his analysis to a higher level than has usually been the case in Nepal-where discussions of civil society are often embroiled in day-to-day antagonisms and take the form of accusation and defence.

The starting point for Shah’s thesis is the highly potent role that civil society groups played in the 2006 Jana Andolan. The credibility of the political parties that led the movement against the monarchy had been severely damaged over the preceding decade. As a result, large sections of the population, especially in the towns and cities, were initially unwilling to come out in support of a movement they led. This changed as leaders of civil society stepped in. Their leadership was perceived to be much more legitimate and hundreds of thousands came out onto the streets under their leadership.

Shah, however, questions the unquestioned legitimacy and uncritical adoption of the term ‘civil society’. As he demonstrates, civil society means very different things in the home of its birth, the modern West, and in countries like Nepal. In the West, civil society emerged with the advent of modernity, as a sphere of action outside of the state, but which nevertheless influenced it. The concept was then gradually transplanted into the poorer nations. But its position in countries like Nepal-which have a very high degree of dependency, are fragmented and possess a very weak state-is very different from the industrialised, centralised countries of the West.

Shah’s basic argument that civil society in Nepal gains its autonomy from the state only at the expense of becoming heavily dependent on external patrons. These external patrons, on the other hand, are by no means disinterested, but rather, through the funding of civil society organisations in the developing world, seek to further their own strategic interests. The increasing interest that the West has taken in civil society as a policy instrument is because, Shah states, it is "cost effective, flexible and deniable." In addition, "unlike political parties and trade unions, civil society is less tied to local constituencies or the electorate and therefore more responsive to donors."

Shah thus seeks to demonstrate that civil society, during the Jana Andolan and after, through political mobilisation and other activity has actively weakened the state. The U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID), for example, by actively promoting workshops and seminars on issues such as constitution drafting and “balancing people’s sovereignty against constitutional monarchy” aided in the collapse of the monarchy.

That donors have supported civil society groups in their attempts to promote certain policies is hard to argue against, and Shah presents this view with flair and sophistication. But by focusing excessively on the dependency of Nepal’s civil society, Shah underestimates its capabilities, visions and energies.

The relationship between donors and civil society organisations is much more complex than simply that of subservience, as Shah seems to indicate. And it is this simplistic portrayal of a complicated relationship that constitutes the major flaw in an otherwise stimulating analysis of civil society.