Two directions

TKP 25/8/2009


The day after Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal arrived in Delhi last week, some consternation was visible among the advisors who had accompanied him. For rumours were circulating that the Indians had opened high-level channels of communication with Nepal’s Maoists. Details were scant and it wasn’t clear what this would mean for Nepal’s political process, but for a government that had gone to Delhi to seek assurances that the Indians would do all they could to prolong its tenure, the news was disturbing. Then there had also been embarrassment when Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala, apparently piqued at the prime minister’s refusal to grant her the position of deputy prime minister, refused to accompany him on the visit. Nobody missed Koirala, it was true, but the incident gave the impression that the prime minister was weak and had little control over his cabinet. 
The beginning thus appeared inauspicious, but whatever engagement the Indians had with Nepal’s Maoists was preliminary and thus unlikely to have an immediate impact on policy.


In addition, the Indian establishment was keen to demonstrate respect (and perhaps gratitude) towards the Nepali prime minister. He was, after all, in assuming the position of prime minister at a difficult time, fulfilling one of New Delhi’s major agendas in Nepal — that of keeping the Maoists out of power. 
Besides, there were a number of other circumstances that contributed to the Indian establishment’s mistrust of the Maoists, which could likely lead to a decision to keep the pressure on and weaken them — circumstances that directly benefited Prime Minister Nepal and his government. First, of course, the memory of what was thought to be the Maoists perfidy while in government — in attempting to cultivate China at the expense of India and demonstrating that they had no intention of remaining committed to multi-party democracy — had not receded.


Exacerbating these fears were other issues internal to India. Recognition that Maoist posed a serious threat to India’s security, the establishment’s position towards the Naxalites had hardened. Delhi was abuzz with talk of how military and paramilitary forces would be deployed against the Indian Maoists in October. Given the penchant of Indian intelligence agencies to see links between the Nepali and Indian Maoists on the scantest evidence, it was clear that a hard line taken against Indian Maoists could easily translate into a hard line taken against those of Nepal. 


Then, worries regarding China’s intent had also increased, following the dissemination of an article published on a Chinese nationalist website that argued how China could encircle and balkanize India. Fears ran high, and it was conceivable how, even in the absence of adequate information regarding the links between Nepal’s Maoists and the Chinese, the Indians would feel it in their best interest to attempt to demoralize the Maoists to such an extent that they would be forced to sever whatever links they had with the Chinese establishment and come completely under Delhi’s control. 


So the message Prime Minister Nepal received was that the Indian establishment wanted him to remain in charge until the constitution was drafted and elections held, that he should remain adamant and refuse to integrate any Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army. Privately, however, the Indians realize that it is impossible to complete the peace process while maintaining such an obdurate stance against the Maoists. There now appears to be official acknowledgement within India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) that there is a high likelihood that the constitution will not be drafted on time, especially if the current state of affairs persists. 


There is a remote chance that the current government will last until the constitution is drafted and an even remoter chance that the Maoists will join a government under the leadership of the CPN-UML. The logical progression of the policy to exclude the Maoists from real power is thus the establishment of a regime formed through extra-constitutional means or the invocation of emergency powers, such as one led by the president and backed by the military. This would mean the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (CA) and the end of the peace process. 


The Indian establishment has been contemplating such an eventuality, but it is averse to it. It is understood that this will bring increased polarization and conflict in Nepal, and that it will be difficult to stem the anarchy that could be unleashed. While the Indians would have major control over any governing coalition that is established in such a scenario, this will be of little use, for such a government will be wholly paralysed. This would not be in India’s interest for a number of reasons, not least for its own national security. Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal was asked to pay attention to and control third-country elements acting against India through Nepali soil. As all his energies are consumed struggling to maintain his own position and security within his own country’s border, the Nepali prime minister will find it difficult to devote much energy to this Indian request. An extra-constitutional regime such as one envisioned will be even more consumed by domestic priorities and even less able to pay much attention to Indian interests. 


In the longer term, it is in India’s interest to have the peace process culminate along the lines laid out in the 12-point agreement and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This is the only way in which a government that commands long-term legitimacy can be established in Kathmandu. Only such a government can work towards strengthening the state, absorbing the political participation of the masses into legitimate channels and maintaining the rule of law — all of which are necessary if the Nepali state is to have the capacity to address Indian security concerns. 


There is increasing recognition in the Indian establishment that for such a scenario to come about it is necessary to engage with the Maoists and bring them back into government. Influential journalists and activists in Delhi have been urging the same line. Engagement with the Maoists has thus begun, but there is some way to go before India is convinced that they are committed to preventing Chinese penetration into Nepali affairs and to a plural democratic framework. When the Indians are suitably convinced — and there is a high likelihood that they will be since the other alternative is so dire — a sea change in Nepal’s political landscape can be expected. 


As for Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal: The initial embarrassment he felt soon evaporated when faced with the hospitality and graciousness of India’s top political leaders. All support was promised and some deals were signed, enabling him to give the impression that he was returning home with his bags full of gifts for the Nepali people. 


But the prime minister’s jubilance was slightly dampened on Thursday afternoon — his last day in Delhi — when he went to the India International Centre (ICC) to give a talk. Introducing him was the dignified Soli Sorabjee, who, while otherwise lavishing praise, let it slip that the Nepali prime minister was “also popularly known as Makunay.” The septuagenarian former Attorney General of the Indian federation perhaps thought that “Makunay” was an affectionate honorific, an appellation similar to “Girijababu.” The Nepalis in the audience, aware of the derogatory connotation that the name contained, cringed, while Madhav Nepal sat apparently impassive. But it became clear that the prime minister was perturbed for when he took the stage he said, “My name is Madhav Kumar Nepal. Popularly known as Mr. Nepal. Not what you heard earlier.” But all this was quickly forgotten, and that evening, when the prime minister was presented to a whirl of faces and handshakes at a reception at the Oberoi hotel, there was the shine of exhilaration in his eyes.