Mood for a stir

TKP 10/8/2009

There is little desire for immediate compromise on both sides of the “civilian supremacy” debate

It is easy to get confused listening to the absurd, legalistic arguments on both sides of the recently intensified “civilian supremacy” debate. The Maoists argue that the month during which the government had promised to reach agreement on the issue has gone by without any resolution and the party is therefore forced to begin protests. The government argues that it had merely said that it would attempt to reach a resolution within a month. Complicated arguments are deployed as to why the Maoists should or shouldn’t be allowed to discuss the issue in the legislature; why they should or shouldn’t bring a proposal demanding the impeachment of the president. But the reason why the debate appears so complicated is because the parties involved have to give the impression that they are open for compromise even though there is currently little desire for one: the government feels it will be undermined if it gives in (because that would reveal the very process of the formation of the government to be illegitimate) and the Maoists are driven by a compulsion to undertake any mass activity, regardless of purpose, that will strengthen the party and weaken the government.

The Maoists’ ultimate intention is to bring about a collapse of the current government and replace it with one under their leadership. For that to happen, a shift in alignments needs to occur among the political elite. At the moment, the constellation that has formed in support of this government and against the Maoists is unyielding. Maoist attempts are breaking up the coalition have so far been futile. But it is also clear that the application of brute force through the streets is not sufficient to bring about a change in alignments to the favour of the Maoists.

In fact, as the Maoists recognize, the application of excess force that would disrupt daily lives and paralyse the government could be counterproductive. First, it would antagonize the very population that the Maoists are struggling to convince of the necessity to maintain “civilian supremacy” through overturning the president’s decision to reinstate the Army chief. Second, they realize that all important power centres are rallied against them, and to create too much trouble would not only ensure that the coalition’s opposition to the Maoists’ actions will only intensify, but could potentially also strengthen the hand of the right wing, which could use the excuse of intolerable disturbance to retaliate by force. Best not to tempt the right wing too sorely, goes the logic. Better to create controlled disturbances across the country, while the top leadership engages in its attempt to see if it can widen cracks in the governing coalition and use them towards the Maoist party’s advantage.

It is for these reasons that the party that normally considers the hardships the population has to face as a result of disruptive street action to be, in Trotsky’s words, “the overhead expenses of historic progress”, has not announced any plans for bandas or forceful closures of government offices. Except for the forceful obstruction of parliament, all other actions are to be largely symbolic: gatherings in various towns, the boycott of programmes held by the prime minister and president, the showing of black flags.

The immediate objectives of the current protests, then, are twofold. First, it is to prepare the ground for the consolidation of larger public opposition to the government. As the movement progresses, it is likely that other issues that have greater potential for attracting wider support will be adopted in addition to that of “civilian supremacy.” There has already been a decision taken to declare the establishment of autonomous ethnic regions along the lines the Maoists have proposed as a model for the new federal structure. If the government continues to ignore ethnic and regional demands as it has done so far, disillusionment among political activists of various kinds will ripen over subsequent months and the Maoists may be well placed to assume the leadership of a wider front of groups disgruntled with the state.

The second objective for the Maoists is to revive the networks they created during the years of the war and the period before the Constituent Assembly (CA) election. One of the major achievements of the Maoists during their struggle was their success in organising people whose participation in politics had previously been limited to casting votes during general elections. By organising interests under the aegis of the party and outside the control of the state, the Maoists created networks of power that had not previously existed in Nepali society.

This helped propel them to power, but these networks became difficult for the party to manage after entering the peace process and, to a greater extent, after entering government. For, inexperienced at governance and having raised unrealistic aspirations among those who were cajoled to support the party, there was no possible way they could fulfill the expectations they had raised. They had to pay attention to other social groups and networks at the expense of their loyal supporters. As much as the Maoists tried to include them in the spoils of power, this was not always possible. Leaders of their ethnic fronts began to feel that the Maoists had treated the question of ethnic liberation as an instrument to attain power. As the party’s activities became concentrated in Kathmandu, cadres in the districts began to feel demoralized and let down. Recognising this, the Maoist leadership feels that the current period where they are out of government and have little to do in Kathmandu, should be utilized to go out, raise morale among party workers, reactivate party networks and thus strengthen their organization.

The party presumably feels that the dividends of such activity can be reaped in a number of ways in the near future.