A major gamble

TKP 19/5/2009

The next few months are seen by the NC and UML as a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy

The resignation of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” seemed to breathe a new lease of life into the mainstream parliamentary parties. The previous year had been difficult for them. The results of the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections and the eight-month long tenure of the Maoist-led government had pushed them into the defensive. But the prime minister's resignation enabled them to take the initiative to form a new government, which, backed as it is by almost all non-Maoists forces, offered a glimmer of hope that this time around they would be able to set the agenda to which the Maoists would have to react.

This would be a fundamental reversal of the state of affairs that prevailed for all of the past year. The results of the CA elections had revealed how weak the mainstream parties had become. But instead of working to revive their organizations and reinvent their ideology in line with the aspirations of the population, these parties, particularly the Nepali Congress (NC), entered into paralysis. There was a deep insecurity that the Maoists would further weaken them. And amid the demoralization of the party body, this fear gave rise to a kind of hysteria. The sole strategic calculation was that, as the Maoists were intent on sweeping away other parties from the political landscape, they needed to be opposed at all costs. Every decision they took that alienated a section of the population was treated by the NC as an opportunity to rally social groups against the Maoists. But the NC lacked a strong organization and was unable to rebuild credibility among the electorate. It was thus natural that, in the major confrontation over the Maoist attempt to remove the Army chief, the NC was pushed to embracing two major power centres -- the Nepal Army and New Delhi -- that are disconnected from the population.

The initial optimism that arose in the NC and the UML after the resignation of the prime minister soon hardened into a self-confidence that, by using the resources of the state that would soon come into their control, it would be possible to weaken the Maoists and negotiate with them from a position of strength. New Delhi would prod most of the non-Maoist parties in the CA to support the UML-led government formation. It would provide the resources to shore up the government's ability to deliver and thus regain some degree of credibility among the population. And, if, in the extreme case, military confrontation became inevitable, the Nepal Army would provide the necessary force. The Sri Lankan example became the talk of the town among the most anti-Maoist sections of the parliamentary parties. Regret was expressed that the Rajapaksa example of crushing the LTTE through military means had not been undertaken in Nepal. Some even claimed that it was still possible to follow this route.

But it emerged that this self-confidence was brittle. Dissenting voices began to be heard within the mainstream parliamentary parties and those, such as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), which eventually pledged their support to the new governing constellation. These sections of the political class understood that the Maoists could not so easily be undermined and attempts to do so would invite conflict that could potentially only strengthen the Maoists. Further, these sections also felt that the only hope for progressive change, peace and stability lay in an alliance with the Maoists, in the principles underlying the 12-point and subsequent agreements of the peace process.

But those who doubt the viability of an attempt to weaken the Maoists by keeping them out of government are still currently bound to support the UML-led coalition. This is partly the reason of pressure from powerful internal and external forces. But it cannot be denied that Maoist actions themselves were largely responsible for the deeply polarized political atmosphere where everyone was forced to take sides. The progressive elements in the non-Maoist parties felt let down by the Maoists. Faced with Maoist actions, it became almost inevitable that almost all non-Maoist forces, though not bound by any common cause, would come together in support of the UML-led government formation.

The new governing coalition, which seems set to soon assume office, can follow one of two directions. First, it can continue to push the Maoists into the defensive and spend all its energies on trying to weaken the party. Second, it can put aside the acrimony of the recent past and set out new terms of engagement on how to deal with the Maoists. What is most likely to happen is a combination of the two approaches. As the Cabinet will most likely be dominated by viscerally anti-Maoist politicians, the initial attempt will be to display intransigence towards Maoist demands and try to force them to back down. Given the strength of the Maoist organization and the numbers they command in the CA, however, this strategy will not be viable for long. A government that seeks to rule by actively excluding the Maoists will soon lose its credibility and ability to govern.

If this happens, dissenting voices within the parties of the governing coalition, though currently subdued, will gain more prominence. There will be greater pressure to engage with the Maoists, negotiate an agreement and bring them back to government. Whether this will happen to the advantage of the mainstream parliamentary parties or the Maoists will be determined by the governing coalition's ability to deliver services and thus amass credibility, its ability to undermine the Maoists' support base, and the Maoists' ability to amass public support for their demands for the restoration of “civilian supremacy” and against “external interference.”

What is clear is that the UML and NC attempt to lead government is a major gamble for both parties. The next few months are for them a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy and party organisation. If they succeed they can restore some balance of power with the Maoists and a new agreement to replace or complement the 12-point agreement negotiated. If the NC and UML get even weaker than they have become over the past two years, the Maoists will come back further emboldened, leading the NC and UML in fear and rage to dream of military adventurism.