Living in denial

TKP 8/6/2009

The PLA is now more of a burden to the Maoist leadership than an asset

The new government, if it manages to get past the current conflicts over the distribution of ministerial portfolios, will adopt an intransigent stance towards Maoist demands. In addition to pressure from within its diverse constituents, it will face major pressure from the Nepal Army and India. The government will attempt to reject as far as it is able even those Maoist demands which had informally been acceded to in the past, or those which were previously open to negotiation. Most immediately, the demand for the revocation of the president’s overturning of former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s decision to fire the Army chief has been ignored. More crucially for the future of Nepali politics, the government will adopt a hard position against Maoist demands for integration of their combatants into the Army. It will be a test for the government how far it can maintain its obdurate posture. But even if it able to do so, which appears unlikely for very long, the consequences of such actions cannot but be negative for the broader Nepali polity.

For a number of years now the parties now in power have informally agreed that a few thousand Maoist combatants will be integrated into the Army at the lower levels. The new position, which appears to have been dictated by the Army, is that there will be no integration. Instead, only means of rehabilitating Maoist combatants into Nepali society will be found.

The argument against integration is based on flawed reasoning that still sees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the main strength of the Maoist party. Their entry, even in small numbers, will weaken the national Army, it is thought, and this cannot be allowed to happen. There is also a sense that refusing integration of any kind, coupled with other actions such as reducing the flow of funds to the PLA, will lead to demoralization within its ranks and weaken the Maoist party.

This logic completely ignores the changes that have occurred in the Maoist party since the peace process began over three years ago. Over this period of time the Maoists have expanded their hold over society through their affiliate and front organizations. Instead of a tightly controlled, secretive party, they have become a more diffuse entity and now welcome all sorts of members into their ranks. The main leadership, in its attempts to steer the party through the peace process, has had to devise new ideology and goals; has in its commitment to relatively greater pluralism had to give up on orthodox Maoist doctrine. Organisationally, the Maoists have departed from the traditional Leninist mode where its members are severely tested for commitment and loyalty and the wider population is perceived with suspicion for being potentially antagonistic to the party. There is now a greater effort to reach out to wider sections of society that may not be wholeheartedly committed to the party cause but, nonetheless, are sympathetic to it.

To convince the hardcore PLA base of the desirability of this strategy has been difficult. Consigned to cantonments, without a major role to play in political events, it is natural that Maoist combatants look with envy towards those who may have only recently joined the party but now occupy more substantial positions in it. After all, it is natural that the combatants feel that it is because of them that the Maoist party is in the position of power it is in today, and that by ignoring them, the party is guilty of betrayal.

The party leadership has consistently sought to assuage the resentment of its combatants. It has sought to demonstrate that the current process is only a means to the Maoist objective of seizing all state power. And it has repeatedly promised that massive integration into the Army will take place and that the combatants, currently languishing, will occupy productive and fruitful positions in the power structure of the new state.

Having to constantly alleviate the fears of combatants takes much time and energy on the part of the Maoist leadership. The PLA cannot simply be ignored. Their contribution to the Maoist movement, after all, has been major. The leadership understands that their loyalty needs to be repaid. It also understands that the consequences of an inability to convince the PLA of the legitimacy of the path that the Maoist party has taken will be dire. There is a possibility that Maoist commanders, disillusioned with the party, will take off with groups of commanders to create anarchy in pockets across the country. More likely, and of greater concern to the current leadership, is that elements within the party that view the Maoist entry into the peace process as a betrayal of the cause, will be able to get the support of a disenchanted PLA to pursue a more “revolutionary” path. This would inevitably mean the sidelining of the current Maoist leadership -- Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai among them -- and the rise of those who would take a confrontational, even militaristic, approach towards dealing with the other political parties.

For the current party leadership, then, the PLA is more a burden than an asset. It is commonly assumed that it is because of the presence of the Maoist army that the party seems stronger than it really is; that the mere presence of the army intimidates the population into supporting them or voting for them during elections. Even if one assumes that Maoist support is merely due to intimidation, however, this is not due to the PLA. Its activity, compared to that of the Young Communist League (YCL) and other front organizations, has been negligible. Meanwhile, the PLA continues to siphon off resources from both the state and the party and consumes much energy of the party leadership.

By adamantly insisting that no integration into the national Army will take place, the new government will only make things more difficult for itself. The restiveness this will cause in the Maoist ranks will lead the party to pull into itself and adopt an increasingly hostile position towards the other parties. The voices of those who claim that there can be no progress unless the other political forces are completely demolished will gain prominence. Those in the government who believe otherwise, who seem to believe that a firm administration of force will make the Maoists meekly surrender, are living in denial.