Conflicting values

TKP 11/5/2009

The Maoists and others on the left have always felt that there is an antagonistic relationship between “democracy” and “nationalism”

When Maoists or others on the left of the political spectrum claim that it is essential to strike a balance between “democracy” and “nationalism”, what is implied is that there is necessarily an antagonistic relationship between the two values. Nationalism -- the protection of a supposed singular national identity, the fierce defence of territorial boundaries and decision-making unaffected by external forces -- requires a strong, autonomous state at the centre, which, on crucial issues affecting sovereignty, has to limit the democratic space available so as not to be swayed by the popular mood or by particular interest groups.

These two concepts acquire further local colour when considered in the light of Nepal's geopolitical situation. Accustomed to the perpetual shadows cast over them by their giant neighbours, Nepalis associate democracy with India and nationalism with China. This is not simply because the dominant political value in India is democracy and in China nationalism. What is more important is the question of the degree of external intrusion into the Nepali polity the emphasis on each of these values allows. And when one speaks of external intrusion, one almost always refers to India (the reference to “imperialist America”, especially in left politics/literature is more rhetorical); the Chinese, after all, show little interest in the million perpetual machinations that comprise the internal politics of this country. Their main interest is in having a strong state at the centre, long-lasting and with a strong hold over society, so as to be capable of taking care of the limited Chinese interests here. That is why the northern neighbour has always been keen to bolster any regime that appears to be able to control other political forces and rule single-handedly.

India, on the other hand, has usually had an inimical relationship with any regime that seeks to force its hegemony over the entire political space. First, it has often understood, as after Gyanendra's takeover in 2005, that given Nepal's highly fragmented polity such a regime is unsustainable. And second, it is aware that such non-democratic regimes project themselves as nationalist and court China in an attempt to escape from the influence that India wields.

Besides, a democratic Nepal -- where various parties and interest groups are allowed to compete for power over the state -- suits Indian interests. Nepal's post-1990 democracy was fragmented and competition between political forces often took the form of a zero-sum game. In their bid to undermine their political opponents, Nepali political forces often looked towards power centres in India for support. And this enabled India to further penetrate into Nepal's political space, sometimes influencing outcomes, sometimes acting as arbiter. The more fragmented Nepal's political forces, the greater the differences between them, the more India's hand could be perceived in Nepal's internal affairs.

And so India came to occupy a greater role than usual in the anarchic political atmosphere that followed the 2006 Jana Andolan. It had of course played a crucial arbitration role in the negotiations that led to the alliance between the Maoists and the mainstream parliamentary parties. And whenever relations between these parties became acrimonious and threatened to derail the peace process, India manifestly attempted to mediate and steer political direction. The proliferation of ethnic movements that adopted an antagonistic stance towards the state further enabled India to extend its influence. In late 2007 it many believe engineered a split from the Nepali Congress, which led to the formation of the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP). In early 2008, it coerced three Madhesi parties agitating on the streets to reach an agreement with the government and contest the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections.

For much of this period the Maoists abstained from criticizing India as its actions mostly served to push the peace process forward. But there is still perception in the party that India wished to weaken them and would always act as an obstacle in their long-term goal of hegemony over the state. From the Maoist viewpoint, the past three years have suffered from an excess of “democracy” and a deficiency of “nationalism.” They felt that this state of affairs would have to be remedied: having succeeded in their struggle against “feudalism” by abolishing the monarchy, the time would come to take an assertive stance against “Indian expansionism.”

Although the Maoists did not plan it as such before the event, they were able to project the controversy over their unilateral decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) from office as an issue of gross interference by India. As during previous occasions during the peace process when they had intervened, the Indians wanted a decision that would have the consensus of all political parties. But their apprehensions had increased since the formation of the Maoist-led government: the Maoists' attempt to cozy up to China in particular had given rise to the belief that they posed a long-term national security threat to India and that something needed to be done to check the Maoists. The Maoist attempt to sack the Army chief was treated as such an opportunity. India found ready allies in the non-Maoist political forces and the Nepal Army, bodies which perceived the attempted removal of the Army chief as part of the Maoist design to consolidate control over the state and took a firm stance against the Maoist decision.

But the Maoists decided to take a decision unilaterally, without the consensus of even their coalition partners. After the president, also problematically, overturned the decision, the prime minister resigned but his party continues to use threat and coercion to prevent the formation of a new government. The Maoists justify their actions in the name of both “nationalism” (in opposing directives by the “expansionist” power) and “democracy” (in upholding the principle of civilian supremacy over the Army).

In adamantly refusing to consider the view of other political parties, constricting democratic space and defying Nepal's most important neighbour, the Maoists do have a claim to be upholding the principle of “nationalism.” In doing so, however vehemently they use the rhetoric of civilian supremacy, it is clear that they have moved away from and ridden roughshod over the value of “democracy.” But it is a troubling sign of these deeply polarised times that the political forces backed by India, while paying lip-service to the idea of democracy, are contributing to the strengthening of the Army, an institution that places considerations of national security and institutional interest far above those of a plural polity.