Delusions of grandeur

TKP 27/4/2009

The attempt by the Maoists to remove Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) Rookmangud Katawal from office and install someone pliant and receptive to Maoist demands in his place is a manifestation of the megalomaniacal tendency within the party that is driven solely by the thirst for power. This is the tendency that causes Maoist commanders, union activists and other mid-level leaders to swagger around town with their cohorts in four-wheel drives with specially designed number plates. This is the tendency that makes Maoists at public forums barely able to conceal their superior smirks at the words of their political rivals. And, during the war, it was this tendency that led Maoist leaders to carry out military battles even when it was clear that there was no way that they would be able to prevail over their enemies. For example, at Khara in April 2005, when Prachanda, his rationality overwhelmed by anger against the monarchy, ordered a foolhardy attack on a heavily fortified Army camp, which led to the deaths of around 250 Maoist combatants.

This tendency exists alongside others within the Maoist party, often even within the same individual. It is possible to distinguish this drive for power from at least two other tendencies. The first is the tendency that seeks social transformation through the sober application of government policy that will, in the medium-term, change the character and nature of the state to make it more redistributive in nature and less susceptible to external exploitation. Current Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai exemplifies this tendency.

The second tendency is that of the cerebral Maoist dogmatist who, finding in Maoist doctrine an intellectual foundation for his rage against injustice, has sought to apply this doctrine to the world around him. But he is now deeply uncomfortable with the compromises the Maoists now have to make because they are in a position of power. Mohan Vaidya 'Kiran' is emblematic of this tendency.

These latter two tendencies come to nothing without the power to act and to mobilize the masses, and so they have both sought proximity to the tendency that seeks power at all costs -- of which the great and undisputed leader is Prachanda. His considerations of the varying strands of thought within his party are based chiefly on which particular strategic direction will be more useful to accumulate power for himself and for the party. This is why he is sometimes seen to be close to Baburam Bhattarai and sometimes to Kiran. Sometimes Prachanda chooses from among political lines within the party the one which is likely to enable the party to gain power over the state. Other times he chooses political line from within his party depending on which cannot afford to alienate to maintain his position as supreme leader.

It is primarily the second consideration that has driven Prachanda to so vehemently insist on the removal of the CoAS. Most immediately, he is confronted by a discontented group of Maoist dogmatists who are skeptical of the unprincipled maneuverings Prachanda has had to make since becoming prime minister. Through attempting to be all things to all people, Prachanda has exposed himself to be a leader who lacks any core political principles and does all he can to remain in power. There are murmurings that Kiran and his band wish to see him removed as party chairman, and that, if he wishes to continue in his position, he has to gain the support of Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa 'Badal', who, fed up with what he perceives as Katawal's insubordination, sorely wishes to see the Army chief cut down to size. In the process, Prachanda can also demonstrate to the dogmatists that he is indeed capable of taking a stand and moving the party towards the direction of seizing state power.

But the chain of events that led to the Maoist insistence on the removal of the Army chief did not begin recently; its genesis can be traced to the concluding months of 2008. Then, Prachanda was faced by a group of restive and increasingly assertive People's Liberation Army (PLA) commanders who were worried about their future. Their leaders in the party had appeared to have made a compromise with other political forces that only a nominal number of combatants would be integrated into the Nepal Army (NA) and that too only at the lowest levels. This was unacceptable to Maoist commanders harbouring dreams of gaining lateral entry into the highest levels of the Army and thus gaining substantial control over its chain of command.

Prachanda desperately needed the support of these commanders and the combatants loyal to him before the Kharipati convention of November 2008, where he was under assault by Kiran and his supporters. It appears that he thus made a pact with PLA commanders: in exchange for garnering support at the convention: Prachanda would do all he could to ensure that there would be mass integration into the NA and Maoist commanders would gain ranks commensurate with their position in the PLA.

All along, the Maoists had been seeking specific generals in the Army they could co-opt. And they found such a person in Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka, who seems to have assured them that in exchange for being made CoAS, he would ensure that integration of Maoist combatants would take place very much in line with the desires of the Maoist leadership. If he was to be made Army chief, however, Katawal had to be removed three months before his tenure expired. For, Khadka was due to retire two months before Katawal. If Katawal retired prematurely, Khadka could become CoAS and his term extended. If Katawal served out his entire term, Khadka would retire before him and General Chhatra Man Gurung would take over as Army chief.

The megalomaniacal drives of the Maoist party, and the inability of its leadership, now in government, to place the interests of the nation before those of the party has led to this unfortunate sequence of events. Once again the political class is facing an acute crisis that takes all of their energies to resolve. Matters of economic and public policy have been put on hold. The violent assertion of the Tharus, which has caused disruption and suffering across the Tarai, has scarcely registered on the Maoist consciousness. The growing danger of ethnic radicalism appears a distant abstraction far from Kathmandu. Compared to the gravity of these challenges confronting the nation, the Maoist attempt to sack the Army chief appears myopic, self serving and utterly futile.