TKP 8/6/2009
The PLA is now more of a burden to the Maoist leadership than an asset
The new government, if it manages to get past the current conflicts over the distribution of ministerial portfolios, will adopt an intransigent stance towards Maoist demands. In addition to pressure from within its diverse constituents, it will face major pressure from the Nepal Army and India. The government will attempt to reject as far as it is able even those Maoist demands which had informally been acceded to in the past, or those which were previously open to negotiation. Most immediately, the demand for the revocation of the president’s overturning of former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s decision to fire the Army chief has been ignored. More crucially for the future of Nepali politics, the government will adopt a hard position against Maoist demands for integration of their combatants into the Army. It will be a test for the government how far it can maintain its obdurate posture. But even if it able to do so, which appears unlikely for very long, the consequences of such actions cannot but be negative for the broader Nepali polity.
For a number of years now the parties now in power have informally agreed that a few thousand Maoist combatants will be integrated into the Army at the lower levels. The new position, which appears to have been dictated by the Army, is that there will be no integration. Instead, only means of rehabilitating Maoist combatants into Nepali society will be found.
The argument against integration is based on flawed reasoning that still sees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the main strength of the Maoist party. Their entry, even in small numbers, will weaken the national Army, it is thought, and this cannot be allowed to happen. There is also a sense that refusing integration of any kind, coupled with other actions such as reducing the flow of funds to the PLA, will lead to demoralization within its ranks and weaken the Maoist party.
This logic completely ignores the changes that have occurred in the Maoist party since the peace process began over three years ago. Over this period of time the Maoists have expanded their hold over society through their affiliate and front organizations. Instead of a tightly controlled, secretive party, they have become a more diffuse entity and now welcome all sorts of members into their ranks. The main leadership, in its attempts to steer the party through the peace process, has had to devise new ideology and goals; has in its commitment to relatively greater pluralism had to give up on orthodox Maoist doctrine. Organisationally, the Maoists have departed from the traditional Leninist mode where its members are severely tested for commitment and loyalty and the wider population is perceived with suspicion for being potentially antagonistic to the party. There is now a greater effort to reach out to wider sections of society that may not be wholeheartedly committed to the party cause but, nonetheless, are sympathetic to it.
To convince the hardcore PLA base of the desirability of this strategy has been difficult. Consigned to cantonments, without a major role to play in political events, it is natural that Maoist combatants look with envy towards those who may have only recently joined the party but now occupy more substantial positions in it. After all, it is natural that the combatants feel that it is because of them that the Maoist party is in the position of power it is in today, and that by ignoring them, the party is guilty of betrayal.
The party leadership has consistently sought to assuage the resentment of its combatants. It has sought to demonstrate that the current process is only a means to the Maoist objective of seizing all state power. And it has repeatedly promised that massive integration into the Army will take place and that the combatants, currently languishing, will occupy productive and fruitful positions in the power structure of the new state.
Having to constantly alleviate the fears of combatants takes much time and energy on the part of the Maoist leadership. The PLA cannot simply be ignored. Their contribution to the Maoist movement, after all, has been major. The leadership understands that their loyalty needs to be repaid. It also understands that the consequences of an inability to convince the PLA of the legitimacy of the path that the Maoist party has taken will be dire. There is a possibility that Maoist commanders, disillusioned with the party, will take off with groups of commanders to create anarchy in pockets across the country. More likely, and of greater concern to the current leadership, is that elements within the party that view the Maoist entry into the peace process as a betrayal of the cause, will be able to get the support of a disenchanted PLA to pursue a more “revolutionary” path. This would inevitably mean the sidelining of the current Maoist leadership -- Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai among them -- and the rise of those who would take a confrontational, even militaristic, approach towards dealing with the other political parties.
For the current party leadership, then, the PLA is more a burden than an asset. It is commonly assumed that it is because of the presence of the Maoist army that the party seems stronger than it really is; that the mere presence of the army intimidates the population into supporting them or voting for them during elections. Even if one assumes that Maoist support is merely due to intimidation, however, this is not due to the PLA. Its activity, compared to that of the Young Communist League (YCL) and other front organizations, has been negligible. Meanwhile, the PLA continues to siphon off resources from both the state and the party and consumes much energy of the party leadership.
By adamantly insisting that no integration into the national Army will take place, the new government will only make things more difficult for itself. The restiveness this will cause in the Maoist ranks will lead the party to pull into itself and adopt an increasingly hostile position towards the other parties. The voices of those who claim that there can be no progress unless the other political forces are completely demolished will gain prominence. Those in the government who believe otherwise, who seem to believe that a firm administration of force will make the Maoists meekly surrender, are living in denial.
Monday, June 15, 2009
A major gamble
TKP 19/5/2009
The next few months are seen by the NC and UML as a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy
The resignation of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” seemed to breathe a new lease of life into the mainstream parliamentary parties. The previous year had been difficult for them. The results of the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections and the eight-month long tenure of the Maoist-led government had pushed them into the defensive. But the prime minister's resignation enabled them to take the initiative to form a new government, which, backed as it is by almost all non-Maoists forces, offered a glimmer of hope that this time around they would be able to set the agenda to which the Maoists would have to react.
This would be a fundamental reversal of the state of affairs that prevailed for all of the past year. The results of the CA elections had revealed how weak the mainstream parties had become. But instead of working to revive their organizations and reinvent their ideology in line with the aspirations of the population, these parties, particularly the Nepali Congress (NC), entered into paralysis. There was a deep insecurity that the Maoists would further weaken them. And amid the demoralization of the party body, this fear gave rise to a kind of hysteria. The sole strategic calculation was that, as the Maoists were intent on sweeping away other parties from the political landscape, they needed to be opposed at all costs. Every decision they took that alienated a section of the population was treated by the NC as an opportunity to rally social groups against the Maoists. But the NC lacked a strong organization and was unable to rebuild credibility among the electorate. It was thus natural that, in the major confrontation over the Maoist attempt to remove the Army chief, the NC was pushed to embracing two major power centres -- the Nepal Army and New Delhi -- that are disconnected from the population.
The initial optimism that arose in the NC and the UML after the resignation of the prime minister soon hardened into a self-confidence that, by using the resources of the state that would soon come into their control, it would be possible to weaken the Maoists and negotiate with them from a position of strength. New Delhi would prod most of the non-Maoist parties in the CA to support the UML-led government formation. It would provide the resources to shore up the government's ability to deliver and thus regain some degree of credibility among the population. And, if, in the extreme case, military confrontation became inevitable, the Nepal Army would provide the necessary force. The Sri Lankan example became the talk of the town among the most anti-Maoist sections of the parliamentary parties. Regret was expressed that the Rajapaksa example of crushing the LTTE through military means had not been undertaken in Nepal. Some even claimed that it was still possible to follow this route.
But it emerged that this self-confidence was brittle. Dissenting voices began to be heard within the mainstream parliamentary parties and those, such as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), which eventually pledged their support to the new governing constellation. These sections of the political class understood that the Maoists could not so easily be undermined and attempts to do so would invite conflict that could potentially only strengthen the Maoists. Further, these sections also felt that the only hope for progressive change, peace and stability lay in an alliance with the Maoists, in the principles underlying the 12-point and subsequent agreements of the peace process.
But those who doubt the viability of an attempt to weaken the Maoists by keeping them out of government are still currently bound to support the UML-led coalition. This is partly the reason of pressure from powerful internal and external forces. But it cannot be denied that Maoist actions themselves were largely responsible for the deeply polarized political atmosphere where everyone was forced to take sides. The progressive elements in the non-Maoist parties felt let down by the Maoists. Faced with Maoist actions, it became almost inevitable that almost all non-Maoist forces, though not bound by any common cause, would come together in support of the UML-led government formation.
The new governing coalition, which seems set to soon assume office, can follow one of two directions. First, it can continue to push the Maoists into the defensive and spend all its energies on trying to weaken the party. Second, it can put aside the acrimony of the recent past and set out new terms of engagement on how to deal with the Maoists. What is most likely to happen is a combination of the two approaches. As the Cabinet will most likely be dominated by viscerally anti-Maoist politicians, the initial attempt will be to display intransigence towards Maoist demands and try to force them to back down. Given the strength of the Maoist organization and the numbers they command in the CA, however, this strategy will not be viable for long. A government that seeks to rule by actively excluding the Maoists will soon lose its credibility and ability to govern.
If this happens, dissenting voices within the parties of the governing coalition, though currently subdued, will gain more prominence. There will be greater pressure to engage with the Maoists, negotiate an agreement and bring them back to government. Whether this will happen to the advantage of the mainstream parliamentary parties or the Maoists will be determined by the governing coalition's ability to deliver services and thus amass credibility, its ability to undermine the Maoists' support base, and the Maoists' ability to amass public support for their demands for the restoration of “civilian supremacy” and against “external interference.”
What is clear is that the UML and NC attempt to lead government is a major gamble for both parties. The next few months are for them a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy and party organisation. If they succeed they can restore some balance of power with the Maoists and a new agreement to replace or complement the 12-point agreement negotiated. If the NC and UML get even weaker than they have become over the past two years, the Maoists will come back further emboldened, leading the NC and UML in fear and rage to dream of military adventurism.
The next few months are seen by the NC and UML as a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy
The resignation of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” seemed to breathe a new lease of life into the mainstream parliamentary parties. The previous year had been difficult for them. The results of the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections and the eight-month long tenure of the Maoist-led government had pushed them into the defensive. But the prime minister's resignation enabled them to take the initiative to form a new government, which, backed as it is by almost all non-Maoists forces, offered a glimmer of hope that this time around they would be able to set the agenda to which the Maoists would have to react.
This would be a fundamental reversal of the state of affairs that prevailed for all of the past year. The results of the CA elections had revealed how weak the mainstream parties had become. But instead of working to revive their organizations and reinvent their ideology in line with the aspirations of the population, these parties, particularly the Nepali Congress (NC), entered into paralysis. There was a deep insecurity that the Maoists would further weaken them. And amid the demoralization of the party body, this fear gave rise to a kind of hysteria. The sole strategic calculation was that, as the Maoists were intent on sweeping away other parties from the political landscape, they needed to be opposed at all costs. Every decision they took that alienated a section of the population was treated by the NC as an opportunity to rally social groups against the Maoists. But the NC lacked a strong organization and was unable to rebuild credibility among the electorate. It was thus natural that, in the major confrontation over the Maoist attempt to remove the Army chief, the NC was pushed to embracing two major power centres -- the Nepal Army and New Delhi -- that are disconnected from the population.
The initial optimism that arose in the NC and the UML after the resignation of the prime minister soon hardened into a self-confidence that, by using the resources of the state that would soon come into their control, it would be possible to weaken the Maoists and negotiate with them from a position of strength. New Delhi would prod most of the non-Maoist parties in the CA to support the UML-led government formation. It would provide the resources to shore up the government's ability to deliver and thus regain some degree of credibility among the population. And, if, in the extreme case, military confrontation became inevitable, the Nepal Army would provide the necessary force. The Sri Lankan example became the talk of the town among the most anti-Maoist sections of the parliamentary parties. Regret was expressed that the Rajapaksa example of crushing the LTTE through military means had not been undertaken in Nepal. Some even claimed that it was still possible to follow this route.
But it emerged that this self-confidence was brittle. Dissenting voices began to be heard within the mainstream parliamentary parties and those, such as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), which eventually pledged their support to the new governing constellation. These sections of the political class understood that the Maoists could not so easily be undermined and attempts to do so would invite conflict that could potentially only strengthen the Maoists. Further, these sections also felt that the only hope for progressive change, peace and stability lay in an alliance with the Maoists, in the principles underlying the 12-point and subsequent agreements of the peace process.
But those who doubt the viability of an attempt to weaken the Maoists by keeping them out of government are still currently bound to support the UML-led coalition. This is partly the reason of pressure from powerful internal and external forces. But it cannot be denied that Maoist actions themselves were largely responsible for the deeply polarized political atmosphere where everyone was forced to take sides. The progressive elements in the non-Maoist parties felt let down by the Maoists. Faced with Maoist actions, it became almost inevitable that almost all non-Maoist forces, though not bound by any common cause, would come together in support of the UML-led government formation.
The new governing coalition, which seems set to soon assume office, can follow one of two directions. First, it can continue to push the Maoists into the defensive and spend all its energies on trying to weaken the party. Second, it can put aside the acrimony of the recent past and set out new terms of engagement on how to deal with the Maoists. What is most likely to happen is a combination of the two approaches. As the Cabinet will most likely be dominated by viscerally anti-Maoist politicians, the initial attempt will be to display intransigence towards Maoist demands and try to force them to back down. Given the strength of the Maoist organization and the numbers they command in the CA, however, this strategy will not be viable for long. A government that seeks to rule by actively excluding the Maoists will soon lose its credibility and ability to govern.
If this happens, dissenting voices within the parties of the governing coalition, though currently subdued, will gain more prominence. There will be greater pressure to engage with the Maoists, negotiate an agreement and bring them back to government. Whether this will happen to the advantage of the mainstream parliamentary parties or the Maoists will be determined by the governing coalition's ability to deliver services and thus amass credibility, its ability to undermine the Maoists' support base, and the Maoists' ability to amass public support for their demands for the restoration of “civilian supremacy” and against “external interference.”
What is clear is that the UML and NC attempt to lead government is a major gamble for both parties. The next few months are for them a crucial window of opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy and party organisation. If they succeed they can restore some balance of power with the Maoists and a new agreement to replace or complement the 12-point agreement negotiated. If the NC and UML get even weaker than they have become over the past two years, the Maoists will come back further emboldened, leading the NC and UML in fear and rage to dream of military adventurism.
Conflicting values
TKP 11/5/2009
The Maoists and others on the left have always felt that there is an antagonistic relationship between “democracy” and “nationalism”
When Maoists or others on the left of the political spectrum claim that it is essential to strike a balance between “democracy” and “nationalism”, what is implied is that there is necessarily an antagonistic relationship between the two values. Nationalism -- the protection of a supposed singular national identity, the fierce defence of territorial boundaries and decision-making unaffected by external forces -- requires a strong, autonomous state at the centre, which, on crucial issues affecting sovereignty, has to limit the democratic space available so as not to be swayed by the popular mood or by particular interest groups.
These two concepts acquire further local colour when considered in the light of Nepal's geopolitical situation. Accustomed to the perpetual shadows cast over them by their giant neighbours, Nepalis associate democracy with India and nationalism with China. This is not simply because the dominant political value in India is democracy and in China nationalism. What is more important is the question of the degree of external intrusion into the Nepali polity the emphasis on each of these values allows. And when one speaks of external intrusion, one almost always refers to India (the reference to “imperialist America”, especially in left politics/literature is more rhetorical); the Chinese, after all, show little interest in the million perpetual machinations that comprise the internal politics of this country. Their main interest is in having a strong state at the centre, long-lasting and with a strong hold over society, so as to be capable of taking care of the limited Chinese interests here. That is why the northern neighbour has always been keen to bolster any regime that appears to be able to control other political forces and rule single-handedly.
India, on the other hand, has usually had an inimical relationship with any regime that seeks to force its hegemony over the entire political space. First, it has often understood, as after Gyanendra's takeover in 2005, that given Nepal's highly fragmented polity such a regime is unsustainable. And second, it is aware that such non-democratic regimes project themselves as nationalist and court China in an attempt to escape from the influence that India wields.
Besides, a democratic Nepal -- where various parties and interest groups are allowed to compete for power over the state -- suits Indian interests. Nepal's post-1990 democracy was fragmented and competition between political forces often took the form of a zero-sum game. In their bid to undermine their political opponents, Nepali political forces often looked towards power centres in India for support. And this enabled India to further penetrate into Nepal's political space, sometimes influencing outcomes, sometimes acting as arbiter. The more fragmented Nepal's political forces, the greater the differences between them, the more India's hand could be perceived in Nepal's internal affairs.
And so India came to occupy a greater role than usual in the anarchic political atmosphere that followed the 2006 Jana Andolan. It had of course played a crucial arbitration role in the negotiations that led to the alliance between the Maoists and the mainstream parliamentary parties. And whenever relations between these parties became acrimonious and threatened to derail the peace process, India manifestly attempted to mediate and steer political direction. The proliferation of ethnic movements that adopted an antagonistic stance towards the state further enabled India to extend its influence. In late 2007 it many believe engineered a split from the Nepali Congress, which led to the formation of the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP). In early 2008, it coerced three Madhesi parties agitating on the streets to reach an agreement with the government and contest the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections.
For much of this period the Maoists abstained from criticizing India as its actions mostly served to push the peace process forward. But there is still perception in the party that India wished to weaken them and would always act as an obstacle in their long-term goal of hegemony over the state. From the Maoist viewpoint, the past three years have suffered from an excess of “democracy” and a deficiency of “nationalism.” They felt that this state of affairs would have to be remedied: having succeeded in their struggle against “feudalism” by abolishing the monarchy, the time would come to take an assertive stance against “Indian expansionism.”
Although the Maoists did not plan it as such before the event, they were able to project the controversy over their unilateral decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) from office as an issue of gross interference by India. As during previous occasions during the peace process when they had intervened, the Indians wanted a decision that would have the consensus of all political parties. But their apprehensions had increased since the formation of the Maoist-led government: the Maoists' attempt to cozy up to China in particular had given rise to the belief that they posed a long-term national security threat to India and that something needed to be done to check the Maoists. The Maoist attempt to sack the Army chief was treated as such an opportunity. India found ready allies in the non-Maoist political forces and the Nepal Army, bodies which perceived the attempted removal of the Army chief as part of the Maoist design to consolidate control over the state and took a firm stance against the Maoist decision.
But the Maoists decided to take a decision unilaterally, without the consensus of even their coalition partners. After the president, also problematically, overturned the decision, the prime minister resigned but his party continues to use threat and coercion to prevent the formation of a new government. The Maoists justify their actions in the name of both “nationalism” (in opposing directives by the “expansionist” power) and “democracy” (in upholding the principle of civilian supremacy over the Army).
In adamantly refusing to consider the view of other political parties, constricting democratic space and defying Nepal's most important neighbour, the Maoists do have a claim to be upholding the principle of “nationalism.” In doing so, however vehemently they use the rhetoric of civilian supremacy, it is clear that they have moved away from and ridden roughshod over the value of “democracy.” But it is a troubling sign of these deeply polarised times that the political forces backed by India, while paying lip-service to the idea of democracy, are contributing to the strengthening of the Army, an institution that places considerations of national security and institutional interest far above those of a plural polity.
The Maoists and others on the left have always felt that there is an antagonistic relationship between “democracy” and “nationalism”
When Maoists or others on the left of the political spectrum claim that it is essential to strike a balance between “democracy” and “nationalism”, what is implied is that there is necessarily an antagonistic relationship between the two values. Nationalism -- the protection of a supposed singular national identity, the fierce defence of territorial boundaries and decision-making unaffected by external forces -- requires a strong, autonomous state at the centre, which, on crucial issues affecting sovereignty, has to limit the democratic space available so as not to be swayed by the popular mood or by particular interest groups.
These two concepts acquire further local colour when considered in the light of Nepal's geopolitical situation. Accustomed to the perpetual shadows cast over them by their giant neighbours, Nepalis associate democracy with India and nationalism with China. This is not simply because the dominant political value in India is democracy and in China nationalism. What is more important is the question of the degree of external intrusion into the Nepali polity the emphasis on each of these values allows. And when one speaks of external intrusion, one almost always refers to India (the reference to “imperialist America”, especially in left politics/literature is more rhetorical); the Chinese, after all, show little interest in the million perpetual machinations that comprise the internal politics of this country. Their main interest is in having a strong state at the centre, long-lasting and with a strong hold over society, so as to be capable of taking care of the limited Chinese interests here. That is why the northern neighbour has always been keen to bolster any regime that appears to be able to control other political forces and rule single-handedly.
India, on the other hand, has usually had an inimical relationship with any regime that seeks to force its hegemony over the entire political space. First, it has often understood, as after Gyanendra's takeover in 2005, that given Nepal's highly fragmented polity such a regime is unsustainable. And second, it is aware that such non-democratic regimes project themselves as nationalist and court China in an attempt to escape from the influence that India wields.
Besides, a democratic Nepal -- where various parties and interest groups are allowed to compete for power over the state -- suits Indian interests. Nepal's post-1990 democracy was fragmented and competition between political forces often took the form of a zero-sum game. In their bid to undermine their political opponents, Nepali political forces often looked towards power centres in India for support. And this enabled India to further penetrate into Nepal's political space, sometimes influencing outcomes, sometimes acting as arbiter. The more fragmented Nepal's political forces, the greater the differences between them, the more India's hand could be perceived in Nepal's internal affairs.
And so India came to occupy a greater role than usual in the anarchic political atmosphere that followed the 2006 Jana Andolan. It had of course played a crucial arbitration role in the negotiations that led to the alliance between the Maoists and the mainstream parliamentary parties. And whenever relations between these parties became acrimonious and threatened to derail the peace process, India manifestly attempted to mediate and steer political direction. The proliferation of ethnic movements that adopted an antagonistic stance towards the state further enabled India to extend its influence. In late 2007 it many believe engineered a split from the Nepali Congress, which led to the formation of the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP). In early 2008, it coerced three Madhesi parties agitating on the streets to reach an agreement with the government and contest the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections.
For much of this period the Maoists abstained from criticizing India as its actions mostly served to push the peace process forward. But there is still perception in the party that India wished to weaken them and would always act as an obstacle in their long-term goal of hegemony over the state. From the Maoist viewpoint, the past three years have suffered from an excess of “democracy” and a deficiency of “nationalism.” They felt that this state of affairs would have to be remedied: having succeeded in their struggle against “feudalism” by abolishing the monarchy, the time would come to take an assertive stance against “Indian expansionism.”
Although the Maoists did not plan it as such before the event, they were able to project the controversy over their unilateral decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) from office as an issue of gross interference by India. As during previous occasions during the peace process when they had intervened, the Indians wanted a decision that would have the consensus of all political parties. But their apprehensions had increased since the formation of the Maoist-led government: the Maoists' attempt to cozy up to China in particular had given rise to the belief that they posed a long-term national security threat to India and that something needed to be done to check the Maoists. The Maoist attempt to sack the Army chief was treated as such an opportunity. India found ready allies in the non-Maoist political forces and the Nepal Army, bodies which perceived the attempted removal of the Army chief as part of the Maoist design to consolidate control over the state and took a firm stance against the Maoist decision.
But the Maoists decided to take a decision unilaterally, without the consensus of even their coalition partners. After the president, also problematically, overturned the decision, the prime minister resigned but his party continues to use threat and coercion to prevent the formation of a new government. The Maoists justify their actions in the name of both “nationalism” (in opposing directives by the “expansionist” power) and “democracy” (in upholding the principle of civilian supremacy over the Army).
In adamantly refusing to consider the view of other political parties, constricting democratic space and defying Nepal's most important neighbour, the Maoists do have a claim to be upholding the principle of “nationalism.” In doing so, however vehemently they use the rhetoric of civilian supremacy, it is clear that they have moved away from and ridden roughshod over the value of “democracy.” But it is a troubling sign of these deeply polarised times that the political forces backed by India, while paying lip-service to the idea of democracy, are contributing to the strengthening of the Army, an institution that places considerations of national security and institutional interest far above those of a plural polity.
A declaration of principles
TKP 4/5/2009
The policy papers prepared for the NDF, though unrealistic, envisage nothing less than a complete overhaul in the way foreign aid is used and perceived
Along with the decade-long conflict, the level and nature of Nepal's economy has been a major cause underlying the demoralization of the Nepali psyche. The population has through education and travel become aware of the possibilities the wider world offers. But because of a lack of a productive base within the nation, it is confronted with the stark choice of either continuing at its current low level of subsistence or travelling to richer lands -- east and west -- to eke out a more productive living. The national economy, in its turn, is heavily dependent on remittances sent back by its citizens working abroad and on the charity that its neighbours and the rich countries of the West offer.
The Maoists are acutely aware of the toll dependency has taken on the national consciousness. In addition to their visions of rapid and prolonged economic growth, they wish to see both the remittance and foreign-aid economies become extinct. Although these factors do not figure in orthodox Marxist doctrine, some basic tinkering with theory enables one to fit remittances and foreign aid into the larger structure of what the Maoists consider to be a “semi-colonial” and “semi-feudal” economy. After entering government, they have had occasion to translate their beliefs into policy prescriptions into a language comprehensible to mainstream economists and development practitioners. The four draft papers prepared by the Finance Ministry and National Planning Commission for the National Development Forum (NDF), scheduled for May 12-14, are the most comprehensive attempt to translate their ideology into action.
It is not necessary to be a Maoist believer to understand the dislocation and trauma that economic migration causes. The terrible conditions that poor migrants are forced to live and work in, the suffering caused to families split apart are well known. As are the effects that excessive dependence on remittances has on the national economy. Scholars have documented how remittances are mostly used on consumer spending, how it tends to accumulate in towns, how it pulls resources from surrounding villages and gradually causes their depletion. Further, remittances, instead of being put to productive use, are heavily used towards buying imports. And this leads to a further erosion of the already meager domestic manufacturing base.
The government's policy makers understand all this. One of the draft papers produced for discussion at the NDF states: “Remittance flow has enhanced growth in real estate transactions and personal consumption -- together with trade sector activities. The declining manufacturing share (from 9 to 7 percent) may be an indication of Nepal's shifting comparative advantages as high remittances inflows are exerting upwards pressure on real wages. The external competitiveness of manufacturing may be eroded while incentives to invest in the service sector may be on the rise.” But it is also clear that the country's finances are heavily dependent on remittances, and that any fluctuation here could lead to significant negative effects on the economy. There are no immediate plans, then, to discourage economic migration.
Instead, a major change in policy is envisaged towards the other great source of external funds: foreign aid. That foreign aid, instead of providing Nepal with a short-term boost that has put it on the path of capital formation and growth, has further entrenched the culture of dependency is well known. Accustomed as they are to equating foreign aid with imperialism, the Maoists view this tendency with greater unease than any of the other political parties. There is also concern that aid is uncontrolled, unmonitored, dispersed and, as a consequence, leads to a squandering of resources; that it is used more according to the priorities of the donors than to those of the government; and that this has undermined the government's abilities to deliver.
So the draft of the new Foreign Aid Policy envisages a dramatic change in regulations that ensure how foreign aid is received and spent. Loans are to be discouraged and grants below USD 5 million disallowed. Technical assistance that relies on expatriate expertise is to be limited, the finances of INGOs to come under total surveillance of state authorities.
The broad philosophical underpinnings of these measures are nothing less than a complete overhaul of the way in which foreign aid is used and perceived. Instead of handouts provided by the rich to relieve the ills of a struggling, poverty stricken nation, aid is to act as a supplement to the efforts of a dynamic nation making great strides to emerge out of poverty. It is to be “demand driven rather than imposed at the will of the donor.” Priority is to be allotted to private and foreign investment; aid is to occupy a secondary position as handmaiden to this.
What is happening here is that the government is, through the means of policy alone, attempting to change the position of Nepal in the international order. Nepal is now perceived as a country at the bottom of the economic ladder, completely dependent on external largesse. The new policy envisions a jump several rungs higher, to the position of a country which, while still poor, has already embarked on the path of internal capital accumulation and growth, and thus has the confidence to be selective about the aid it receives. But it is clear to all that there is no corresponding increase in the country's productive base or institutional capacities commensurate with the government's apparent confidence.
The Finance Ministry has sought to project self-confidence by promising a sudden and dramatic improvement in the performance of state bodies and the investment climate. It maintains that it will achieve an annual growth rate of 8.5 percent for the next few years and that all aid will be phased out by 2025. But these projections seem to have little connection with currently prevailing realities, leading experienced, world-weary economists and development practitioners to shak e their heads and question the competence of a Finance Minister otherwise respected for his probity and exertions.
The government's grandiose plans may be a mirage. In fact, with the Maoist withdrawal from government, it is even unclear whether the NDF will be held as scheduled. But the envisioned economic and foreign aid policy are attractive if read more as a declaration of principles rather than a concrete plan, and they lay out the general direction that subsequent governments ought to follow.
The policy papers prepared for the NDF, though unrealistic, envisage nothing less than a complete overhaul in the way foreign aid is used and perceived
Along with the decade-long conflict, the level and nature of Nepal's economy has been a major cause underlying the demoralization of the Nepali psyche. The population has through education and travel become aware of the possibilities the wider world offers. But because of a lack of a productive base within the nation, it is confronted with the stark choice of either continuing at its current low level of subsistence or travelling to richer lands -- east and west -- to eke out a more productive living. The national economy, in its turn, is heavily dependent on remittances sent back by its citizens working abroad and on the charity that its neighbours and the rich countries of the West offer.
The Maoists are acutely aware of the toll dependency has taken on the national consciousness. In addition to their visions of rapid and prolonged economic growth, they wish to see both the remittance and foreign-aid economies become extinct. Although these factors do not figure in orthodox Marxist doctrine, some basic tinkering with theory enables one to fit remittances and foreign aid into the larger structure of what the Maoists consider to be a “semi-colonial” and “semi-feudal” economy. After entering government, they have had occasion to translate their beliefs into policy prescriptions into a language comprehensible to mainstream economists and development practitioners. The four draft papers prepared by the Finance Ministry and National Planning Commission for the National Development Forum (NDF), scheduled for May 12-14, are the most comprehensive attempt to translate their ideology into action.
It is not necessary to be a Maoist believer to understand the dislocation and trauma that economic migration causes. The terrible conditions that poor migrants are forced to live and work in, the suffering caused to families split apart are well known. As are the effects that excessive dependence on remittances has on the national economy. Scholars have documented how remittances are mostly used on consumer spending, how it tends to accumulate in towns, how it pulls resources from surrounding villages and gradually causes their depletion. Further, remittances, instead of being put to productive use, are heavily used towards buying imports. And this leads to a further erosion of the already meager domestic manufacturing base.
The government's policy makers understand all this. One of the draft papers produced for discussion at the NDF states: “Remittance flow has enhanced growth in real estate transactions and personal consumption -- together with trade sector activities. The declining manufacturing share (from 9 to 7 percent) may be an indication of Nepal's shifting comparative advantages as high remittances inflows are exerting upwards pressure on real wages. The external competitiveness of manufacturing may be eroded while incentives to invest in the service sector may be on the rise.” But it is also clear that the country's finances are heavily dependent on remittances, and that any fluctuation here could lead to significant negative effects on the economy. There are no immediate plans, then, to discourage economic migration.
Instead, a major change in policy is envisaged towards the other great source of external funds: foreign aid. That foreign aid, instead of providing Nepal with a short-term boost that has put it on the path of capital formation and growth, has further entrenched the culture of dependency is well known. Accustomed as they are to equating foreign aid with imperialism, the Maoists view this tendency with greater unease than any of the other political parties. There is also concern that aid is uncontrolled, unmonitored, dispersed and, as a consequence, leads to a squandering of resources; that it is used more according to the priorities of the donors than to those of the government; and that this has undermined the government's abilities to deliver.
So the draft of the new Foreign Aid Policy envisages a dramatic change in regulations that ensure how foreign aid is received and spent. Loans are to be discouraged and grants below USD 5 million disallowed. Technical assistance that relies on expatriate expertise is to be limited, the finances of INGOs to come under total surveillance of state authorities.
The broad philosophical underpinnings of these measures are nothing less than a complete overhaul of the way in which foreign aid is used and perceived. Instead of handouts provided by the rich to relieve the ills of a struggling, poverty stricken nation, aid is to act as a supplement to the efforts of a dynamic nation making great strides to emerge out of poverty. It is to be “demand driven rather than imposed at the will of the donor.” Priority is to be allotted to private and foreign investment; aid is to occupy a secondary position as handmaiden to this.
What is happening here is that the government is, through the means of policy alone, attempting to change the position of Nepal in the international order. Nepal is now perceived as a country at the bottom of the economic ladder, completely dependent on external largesse. The new policy envisions a jump several rungs higher, to the position of a country which, while still poor, has already embarked on the path of internal capital accumulation and growth, and thus has the confidence to be selective about the aid it receives. But it is clear to all that there is no corresponding increase in the country's productive base or institutional capacities commensurate with the government's apparent confidence.
The Finance Ministry has sought to project self-confidence by promising a sudden and dramatic improvement in the performance of state bodies and the investment climate. It maintains that it will achieve an annual growth rate of 8.5 percent for the next few years and that all aid will be phased out by 2025. But these projections seem to have little connection with currently prevailing realities, leading experienced, world-weary economists and development practitioners to shak e their heads and question the competence of a Finance Minister otherwise respected for his probity and exertions.
The government's grandiose plans may be a mirage. In fact, with the Maoist withdrawal from government, it is even unclear whether the NDF will be held as scheduled. But the envisioned economic and foreign aid policy are attractive if read more as a declaration of principles rather than a concrete plan, and they lay out the general direction that subsequent governments ought to follow.
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Nepal - Tiltshifted!
School in Hangdewa VDC, Taplejung DistrictPhoto by Yadav KC
Children in assembly
Pashupatinath, Kathmandu
Teej festival
Bhaktapur
Sunday, June 7, 2009
U.S news anchor puts her foot in it in Mount Everest interview
It's late, I've been packing, I should be sleeping but instead I wanted to share this little youtube gem with you, in which a newscaster is about to talk to a man who climbed Mount Everest, but makes a spectacularly un-p.c gaffe live on air.
News Anchor: "We're about to interview Eric Wyhenmeyer who climbed the highest mountain in the world...... but he's GAY.... he's gay? I mean, excuse me, he's blind."
News Anchor: "We're about to interview Eric Wyhenmeyer who climbed the highest mountain in the world...... but he's GAY.... he's gay? I mean, excuse me, he's blind."
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Afghan Businessman Tortured by UAE Prince
An article of mine from Hardnews:
Gruesome UAE torture tapesVideo footage of the UAE prince shows him torturing 25 more victims
Sophia Furber London
A tape of a wealthy UAE prince torturing an Afghan immigrant has been leaked to the US by a former business partner. The tape shows Sheikh Issa Bin Zayed al Nayhan whipping Afghan businessman, Mohammed Shah Poor, repeatedly on the face and body, beating him with a plank with nails protruding from it and, finally, running him over with a jeep. The sound of bones breaking is clearly audible in the tape. Poor had allegedly cheated the prince in a grain deal.
Bassam Nablusi, a Lebanese-American businessman who had worked for Sheikh Issa for several years, smuggled the tape to the US, where it was aired on ABC News in mid-April. Nablusi claims that he was imprisoned and tortured in the UAE after he confronted the prince about the abuses, and later, escaped to the US with the help of the American Embassy.
Nablusi's lawyers now claim that they have video footage of Sheikh Issa torturing 25 more victims. Some of these are said to be Sudanese migrant workers and the tapes show members of the UAE security forces aiding in torture. "I have access to at least three witnesses, all of whom will testify that the brutality exhibited in the videos by Sheikh Issa is part of a pattern of conduct... that was well known to various government officials within Abu Dhabi," said Anthony Buzbee, Nablusi's lawyer.
The authorities in the Emirates failed to take any action to against Sheikh Issa, who is a brother of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. The government claimed that the dispute between Sheikh Issa and Poor had been 'settled privately' and that the prince's actions did not form part of a 'pattern' of abusive behaviour.
For more information on human rights abuses against immigrant workers in the Gulf, please visit www.migrant-rights.org
Gruesome UAE torture tapesVideo footage of the UAE prince shows him torturing 25 more victims
Sophia Furber London
A tape of a wealthy UAE prince torturing an Afghan immigrant has been leaked to the US by a former business partner. The tape shows Sheikh Issa Bin Zayed al Nayhan whipping Afghan businessman, Mohammed Shah Poor, repeatedly on the face and body, beating him with a plank with nails protruding from it and, finally, running him over with a jeep. The sound of bones breaking is clearly audible in the tape. Poor had allegedly cheated the prince in a grain deal.
Bassam Nablusi, a Lebanese-American businessman who had worked for Sheikh Issa for several years, smuggled the tape to the US, where it was aired on ABC News in mid-April. Nablusi claims that he was imprisoned and tortured in the UAE after he confronted the prince about the abuses, and later, escaped to the US with the help of the American Embassy.
Nablusi's lawyers now claim that they have video footage of Sheikh Issa torturing 25 more victims. Some of these are said to be Sudanese migrant workers and the tapes show members of the UAE security forces aiding in torture. "I have access to at least three witnesses, all of whom will testify that the brutality exhibited in the videos by Sheikh Issa is part of a pattern of conduct... that was well known to various government officials within Abu Dhabi," said Anthony Buzbee, Nablusi's lawyer.
The authorities in the Emirates failed to take any action to against Sheikh Issa, who is a brother of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. The government claimed that the dispute between Sheikh Issa and Poor had been 'settled privately' and that the prince's actions did not form part of a 'pattern' of abusive behaviour.
For more information on human rights abuses against immigrant workers in the Gulf, please visit www.migrant-rights.org
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